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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on product quality in commercial aviation. Since
the mid-1990s, major airlines that serve the U.S. domestic market have increasingly found it
appealing to form alliances. Amidst the recent emergence of airline alliance formation, this
dissertation has sought to answer questions on the product quality implications of policies
regarding cooperation among airlines in the U.S. domestic air travel industry. A challenge
that empirical work faces in studying the relationship between airline alliances and product
quality is to find reasonable measure(s) of product quality.
The first essay sheds light on whether the route network integration that comes with an
airline alliance provides sufficient extra incentive to partner carriers to improve their flight
routing quality. Evidence suggests that routing quality for Delta/Continental/Northwest’s—
our alliance of interest—products decreases in markets where pre-alliance competition among
alliance partners exists, resulting in substantial negative welfare effects for passengers. In
fact, routing quality for Delta/Continental/Northwest products decreased by 0.256% below
the mean routing quality of the entire sample’s products. More interestingly, the codeshare
effects in specific markets where the alliance firms competed prior to the alliance, are also
negatively associated with routing quality of the alliance firms’ products, resulting in a fall
in consumer utility of $0.5 per consumer.
The second essay explores the potential relationship between on-time performance and
airline code-sharing. Although flight delay has always received much attention, we are
unaware of any empirical research that measures the on-time performance effects of airline
alliances. We empirically investigate the on-time performance effects of the largest U.S.
domestic alliance that began in June 2003—an alliance between Delta Air Lines, Northwest
Airlines and Continental Airlines. We find evidence that code-sharing improves alliance
partners’ on-time performance and that the size of the alliance effect on on-time performance
depends on pre-alliance competition in a market, with the effect being larger in markets
where the partners competed in prior to the alliance.
Using a structural econometric model, the third essay attempts to provide an alternative
explanation to a long-standing question: why are airlines late? Airlines usually claim that
air travel delays are out of their control, placing the blame on adverse weather or air traffic
control as the most common reasons. Despite these claims, data on causes of flight delay
reveal that the share of delay caused by weather and air traffic control has been on the
decline while the share of delay caused by airlines has been on the rise. This suggests that
on-time performance improvement is well within the reach of carriers. We investigate why
airlines have little or no incentive to improve on-time performance. We also measure the
cost of delay borne by consumers in terms of how much monetary value they are willing to
pay to avoid delay. We find that consumers are willing to pay $0.78 for every minute of
arrival delay which after extrapolation, amounts to consumer welfare effects of $1.76 billion.
Our findings suggest that airlines have little to no incentive because their markups do not
increase when they improve on-time performance. In fact, the marginal increase in price
resulting from on-time performance improvement is offset by an increase in marginal cost
causing a zero net effect on markup.
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Chapter 1
Airline Alliance and Product Quality:
The Case of the U.S. Domestic
Airline Industry
1.1 Introduction
Airline alliance formation has a long history in the international air travel market and has
been hailed by some economists for providing airlines with the opportunity to extend their
networks overseas when the alliance agreement is entered with a foreign airline (Pels, 2001;
Brueckner and Whalen, 2000). Airline alliance partners in international air travel link up
their existing complementary networks and build a new network providing an interlining
service to their passengers1. Park (1997) and Hassin and Shy (2004), among others, show
that alliance formations on these kinds of networks are welfare improving.
However, unlike international aviation, alliance formation in the U.S. domestic air travel
market may involve parallel or overlapping networks. In this instance, the cooperation
between alliance partners encompasses markets in which they actually compete. These
1Park (1997)
1
overlapping markets have been a source of concern for policy analysts. They argue that
cooperation in these markets is likely to reduce the competitive pressure on the alliance
partners, and therefore curbs the incentive to improve product quality.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the product quality effects of an airline al-
liance, particularly in markets the partners competed prior to the alliance formation. The
literature on airline alliances is vast, spanning from why they exist2 to how they affect prices
(Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Zou et al., 2011), costs (Gayle and Le, 2013; Goh and Yong,
2006) and market entry (Gayle and Xie, 2014; Lin, 2008). However, questions on potential
product quality effects of airline alliances remained unanswered. This is surprising given
the increasing customer’s awareness of service quality in air travel. Perhaps, this vacuum
results from the difficulty to find a reasonable measure of service/product quality. From
a passenger’s viewpoint, service quality entails a combination of various attributes, some
of which are tangible and others intangible or subjective. These subjective attributes are
difficult to measure since every individual passenger might have a wide range of percep-
tions vis-a`-vis service quality. In this paper, we examine the relationship between airline
alliance and product quality by empirically investigating the Delta/Northwest/Continental
codeshare alliance.
1.2 Delta/Northwest/Continental Codeshare Alliance
The codeshare alliance between Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines and Continental Air-
lines of August 23, 2003 represented the largest domestic codeshare agreement ever approved
in the United States. This agreement involves code sharing, reciprocal frequent-flyer pro-
grams and reciprocal access to airport lounges. In a press release on the alliance, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DoJ) believed that:
2Among others, Tarola (2007) argue that airline alliances in the U.S. soared over the years because of
the increased competition from low-cost carriers, following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
2
“The codeshare agreement could result in lower fares and better service for passengers”3
However, it is worth mentioning that this approval came with some strings attached
due to some anti-competitive concerns expressed by the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion (DoT). First, regulators worry about the large number of markets in which potential
partners’ service overlap since these carriers are direct competitors on some segments of
their respective networks that overlap. Thus, an alliance between them, which often re-
quires optimal integration of their route networks may involve collusion (explicit or tacit)
on prices and/or service levels in the partners’ overlapping markets. A review of the pro-
posed alliance by the DoT shows that the three airlines’ service overlap in 3,214 markets,
accounting for approximately 58 million annual passengers. This large number of overlap-
ping markets contrasts vividly to the next largest alliance at that time, between United
Airlines and US Airways with overlapping service in only 543 markets, accounting for 15.1
million annual passengers. Secondly, the combined market share of the three airlines at the
time of the proposed alliance, was 35 percent—18 percent for Northwest and Continental
combined, and 17 percent for Delta—measured by domestic revenue passenger miles. Again,
this seems substantial when compared to the 23 percent market share of the United/US Air-
ways alliance. The above two main concerns prompted the DoT to impose some conditions
meant to limit potential collusion, size of market presence, joint marketing efforts that could
prevent competition from other carriers, hoarding of airport facilities, and crowding-out of
other airlines from computer reservation system displays4.
On a separate evaluation, the DoJ banned any conduct the alliance carriers could use
to collude on fares or otherwise reduce competition among themselves. Specifically, the
carriers are forbidden from code sharing on each other’s flights wherever they offer compet-
ing nonstop service, such as service between their hubs. The carriers are also required to
continue to act independently when setting award levels or other benefits of their respec-
3U.S. Department of Justice (2003). ”Department of Justice Approves Northwest/Continental/Delta
Marketing Alliance with Conditions.” www.justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2003/200645.htm
4U.S. Department of Transportation (2003). ”Review Under 49 U.S.C. 41720 of Delta, Northwest,
Continental Agreements.” www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2003-03-06/pdf/03-5450.pdf
3
tive frequent-flier programs. Although the DoJ anticipated lower fares as a result of the
codeshare agreement, it is difficult to predict what would happen to product quality.
1.3 Measuring Airline Product Quality
To examine the relationship between airline alliance formation and product quality, it is
essential to find a reasonable measure of product quality. Product quality is like beauty
in the eyes of the beholder and hence a matter of perception (Rhoades and Waguespack,
2004). As such, its measurement constitutes a challenge for empirical work. One measure of
quality used by airline carriers is quality ratings. However, most quality ratings in the air-
line industry are based on subjective surveys about consumer opinions5 and consumers are
usually asked to evaluate the sum of all service interactions with a specific airline. Nonethe-
less, when an airline alliance is involved, things get more complex since an airline alliance’s
services are not an individual service activity but rather a group activity characterized by a
set of service complexities (Janawade, 2011). Hence, it is assumed that service complexities
in an airline alliance context, can be difficult to define and measure. This issue can be well
understood, when passengers book flights from one airline, but might experience services
from a partner airline (Janawade, 2011).
The literature on the quality effects of airline alliances is very limited. In this vein, Tsan-
toulis and Palmer (2008) look at service quality effects of a co-brand alliance. Their measure
of service quality is based on an index constructed using some technical and functional as-
pects of quality. In their paper, the choice of these technical and functional components
to include in the index, and their relative weighting, was informed by a panel of so-called
experts. Goh and Uncles (2003), on the other hand, carry out an empirical study of the
perceptions that business travelers have of the benefits of global alliances. To measure qual-
5Some studies have used the SERVQUAL service quality model. This entails the use of a questionnaire
that measures both the customer expectations of service quality in terms of five quality dimensions, and
their perceptions of the service they receive. When customer expectations are greater than their perceptions
of received delivery, service quality is deemed low.
4
ity, they use a cross-sectional self-completion survey that was administered to a sample of
Australian business travelers.
Tiernan et al. (2008) investigate the service quality of E.U. and U.S. members of main air-
line alliances. They consider three measures of airline service quality: on-time flight arrival
percentage, percentage of flights not canceled and percentage of passengers filing baggage
reports (bags lost, damaged, delayed or pilfered). Their examination of the international
airline alliances indicates no significant differences in the quality of service indicators.
Unlike other measures of quality in airline alliance studies, which are based on a sub-
jective approach, our measure of air travel product quality is typically constructed using
itinerary distance data. Following Chen and Gayle (2013), we refer to this measure as Rout-
ing Quality which is defined as the ratio of nonstop fight distance to the product’s itinerary
fight distance used to get passengers from the origin to destination. Distance-based mea-
sure for product quality has been used by some studies.6 These studies used this measure
as a proxy for itinerary convenience/inconvenience. Based on our routing quality measure,
a nonstop flight between the origin and destination will have the shortest itinerary flight
distance. Hence, air travel products that require intermediate airport stop(s) that are not
on a straight path between the origin and destination, will have an itinerary flight distance
that is longer than the nonstop flight distance. Our rationale for choosing this measure is
that the greater the itinerary flight distance of an intermediate stop product relative to the
nonstop flight distance, the lower the routing quality of this intermediate stop product. A
limitation with our measure of routing quality is that it does not capture any delays the
passenger may have experienced.
6See Reiss and Spiller (1989), Borenstein (1989), Ito and Lee (2007), Fa¨re et al. (2007) and Gayle (2007,
2013)
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1.4 Definitions and Data
1.4.1 Definitions
A market is a directional, round-trip air travel between an origin city and a destination city
during a specific time period. By directional, we mean that a round-trip air travel from
Miami to Las Vegas is a distinct market from a round-trip air travel from Las Vegas to
Miami. This directional definition of a market controls for origin city fixed effects that may
influence market demand (Berry et al., 2006; Gayle, 2007). An itinerary, which also refers
to a ticket, is a planned route from an origin city to a destination city.
An itinerary comprises one or more flight coupons, each coupon typically representing
travel on a particular flight segment between two airports. Each flight itinerary has, by
definition, a single ticketing/marketing carrier (the airline that issues and sells the ticket
for the seat) and one or more operating carriers (the airline whose aircraft and crew are
used to operate the flight). An air travel product is defined as a unique combination of
ticketing carrier, operating carrier(s) and itinerary. Following Gayle (2008) and Ito and Lee
(2007), we focus on three types of air travel products: pure online; traditional codeshare;
and virtual codeshare. Figure 1.1 depicts a pure online air travel product using an itinerary
that requires travel from Miami (MIA) to Las Vegas (LAS) with one intermediate stop
in Dallas (DFW). Thus, for a pure online product, the same airline is the ticketing and
operating carrier on all segments of the trip. In Figure 1.1, the itinerary is marketed by
Delta Air Lines and both segments of the itinerary are also operated by Delta Air Lines.
Figure 1.1: Pure Online Product
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An air travel product is said to be code-shared if the operating and ticketing carriers
for that itinerary differ. In this case, we consider two types of codeshare products: (1)
traditional codeshare; and (2) virtual codeshare. We define a traditional codeshare product
as one having a single ticketing carrier, but multiple operating carriers, one of which is the
ticketing carrier.
Figure 1.2 shows an illustration of a traditional codeshare air travel product for an
itinerary that requires travel from Miami (MIA) to Las Vegas (LAS) with one intermediate
stop in Dallas (DFW). Delta Air Lines is the ticketing/marketing carrier for both segments
and only operates the first leg of the itinerary (Miami to Dallas), while Northwest Airlines
operates the Dallas-Las Vegas segment.
Figure 1.2: Traditional Codeshare Product
A virtual codeshare air travel product is defined as having the same operating carrier for
all segments of the itinerary, however the ticketing carrier is different from the operating
carrier. An illustration of a virtual codeshare product is shown in Figure 1.3 with an
itinerary that requires travel from Miami (MIA) to Las Vegas (LAS) with one intermediate
stop in Dallas (DFW). The connecting itinerary is entirely operated by Northwest Airlines
but solely marketed by Delta Air Lines.
1.4.2 Data
We use data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by the Office
of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The data are quarterly
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Figure 1.3: Virtual Codeshare Product
and represent a 10 percent sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. A record in
this survey represents a flight itinerary. Each record or itinerary contains information on;
(i) the identities of origin, destination, and intermediate stop(s) airports on an itinerary;
(ii) the identities of ticketing and operating carriers on the itinerary; (iii) the price of
the ticket; (iv) the number of passengers who bought the ticket at that price; (v) total
itinerary distance flown from origin to destination; and (vi) the nonstop distance between
the origin and destination. The DB1B data does not include passenger-specific information,
that would facilitate the estimation of a richer demand model than the one we use based on
available data. Also missing, is information on ticket restrictions such as advance-purchase
and length-of-stay requirements. Given that the Delta/Northwest/Continental alliance was
formed in August of 2003, the third and fourth quarters of 2002 represent the pre-alliance
period whereas the third and fourth quarters of 2004 represent the post-alliance period7.
The raw DB1B data set contains millions of itineraries for each quarter. For example, the
third quarter of 2002 consists of 7,759,221 observations. In order to construct our data set,
we place some restrictions on the raw data. First, we restrict our analysis to U.S. domestic
flights operated by U.S. domestic carriers. Second, we only consider, passengers purchasing
round-trip, coach class tickets. Third, inflation-adjusted fares less than $25 or greater than
$2,000 are excluded. Excluding real fares that are too low gets rid of discounted fares that
may be due to passengers using their frequent-flier miles to offset the full price of the trip or
employee travel tickets. Similarly, excluding fares that are too high gets rid of first-class or
7Using data from the same quarters for both years will control for potential seasonal effects in demand.
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business-class tickets. Fourth, we also limit our analysis to air travel products possessing at
least 9 passengers per quarter to exclude products that are not part of the regular offerings
by an airline. Fifth, we restrict our analysis to itineraries with the following characteristics:
(i) within the 48 states in U.S. mainland; (ii) no more than two intermediate stops; and
(iii) with a single ticketing carrier.
Finally, in the spirit of Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), the selection of markets focuses
on air travel amongst the 65 largest U.S. cities. The size of these cities is based on the
Census Bureau’s Population Estimates Program (PEP), which produces estimates of U.S.
population. Data are drawn from the category “Cities and Towns.” We use the size of
population in the origin city as a proxy for potential market size. We group cities that
belong to the same metropolitan areas and share the same airport. Table 1.1 presents a
list of the cities and corresponding airport groupings. Given that there are often multiple
records for the same itinerary because different passengers paid different prices, we construct
the price and quantity variables by averaging the airfares and aggregating the number of
passengers, respectively, based on our product definition, and then collapse the data by
product. Therefore, in the collapsed dataSET that we use for analyses, a product appears
only once during a given time period. Our final working data set includes a total of 55
metropolitan areas (“cities”) and 63 airports representing 153,794 air travel products bought
by over 22.8 million passengers across 11, 534 different directional city-pair markets.
Table 1.2 presents pre- and post-alliance service levels (number of passengers). While
service levels decreased for some carriers, Delta, Northwest and Continental actually experi-
enced an increase in service levels of 4.8 percent, 15.87 percent and 64.69 percent respectively
over the pre-post alliance periods.
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Table 1.1: Cities, airports and population
City, State Airports City Population
2002 2004
New York1 LGA, JFK, EWR 8,606,988 8,682,908
Los, Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,786,010 3,796,018
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,886,634 2,848,996
Dallas, TX2 DAL, DFW 2,362,046 2,439,703
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,002,144 2,058,645
Phoenix, AZ3 PHX 1,951,642 2,032,803
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,486,712 1,514,658
San Antonio, TX SAT 1,192,591 1,239,011
San Diego, CA SAN 1,251,808 1,274,878
San Jose, CA SJC 896,076 901,283
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 841,722 848,227
Detroit, MI DTW 922,727 924,016
San Francisco, CA SFO 761,983 773,284
Jacksonville, FL JAX 758,513 778,078
Indianapolis, IN IND 783,028 787,198
Austin, TX AUS 671,486 696,384
Columbus, OH CMH 723,246 735,971
Charlotte, NC CLT 577,191 614,446
Memphis, TN MEM 674,478 681,573
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN MSP 660,771 653,872
Boston, MA BOS 585,366 607,367
Baltimore, MD BWI 636,141 641,004
Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 503,524 534,599
El Paso, TX ELP 574,337 582,952
Seattle, WA SEA 570,166 570,961
Nashville, TN BNA 544,375 570,068
Milwaukee, WI MKE 589,975 601,081
Washington, DC DCA, IAD 564,643 579,796
Las Vegas, NV LAS 506,695 534,168
Louisville, KY SDF 553,049 558,389
Portland, OR PDX 537,752 533,120
Oklahoma City, OK OKC 518,516 526,939
Tucson, AZ TUS 501,332 517,246
Atlanta, GA ATL 419,476 468,839
Albuquerque, NM ABQ 464,178 486,319
Kansas City, MO MCI 443,390 458,618
Sacramento, CA SMF 433,801 446,295
Long Beach, CA LGB 470,398 470,620
Omaha, NE OMA 399,081 426,549
Miami, FL MIA 371,953 378,946
Cleveland, OH CLE 468,126 455,798
Oakland, CA OAK 401,348 394,433
Colorado Springs, CO COS 369,945 388,097
Tulsa, OK TUL 390,991 382,709
Wichita, KS ICT 354,306 353,292
St. Louis, MO STL 347,252 350,705
New Orleans, LA MSY 472,540 461,915
Tampa, FL TPA 315,151 320,713
Santa Ana, CA SNA 341,411 339,319
Cincinnati, OH CVG 322,278 331,717
Pittsburg, PA PIT 327,652 320,394
Lexington, KY LEX 262,706 274,581
Buffalo, NY BUF 287,469 281,757
Norfolk, VA ORF 238,343 241,979
Ontario, CA ONT 164,734 168,068
1 New York-Newark-Jersey
2 Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth-Plano, TX
3 Phoenix-Temple-Mesa, AZ
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Table 1.2: Airlines # of passengers pre- and post-alliance
Code Airline # of Passengers
2002
Q3-Q4
2004
Q3-Q4
AA American Airlines(a) 1,931,322 1,938,342
AQ Aloha Air Cargo 1,909,012 1,784
AS Alaska Airlines(a) 1,491,700 334,158
B6 JetBlue Airways 1,441,918 219,431
CO Continental Air Lines(a) 877,425 919,919
DL Delta Air Lines(a) 839,691 1,382,877
F9 Frontier Airlines(a) 737,908 252,340
FL AirTran Airways(a) 723,832 233,486
G4 Allegiant Air 327,628 6,070
HA Hawaiian Airlines 194,920 –
HP America West Airlines 151,134 789,576
N7 National Airlines 130,970 –
NJ Vanguard Airlines 99,145 –
NK Spirit Air Lines 72,343 40,370
NW Northwest Airlines(a) 53,305 899,116
QX Horizon Air 47,506 –
RP Chautauqua Airlines 12,008 –
SM Sunworld International Airlines 11,631 –
SY Sun Country Airlines 4,126 31,272
TZ ATA Airlines(a) 2,272 251,231
UA United Air Lines(a) 600 1,583,078
US US Airways(a) 334 704,561
WN Southwest Airlines 287 2,090,517
YX Midwest Airlines 32 92,513
Total 11,061,049 11,770,641
Note: All carriers offer pure online itinerary
(a) Carrier is involved in codeshare product
Table 1.3 shows that among the airlines offering a codeshare products, Delta, Northwest
and Continental account for a whopping 38.91 percent of all codeshare products in our
sample.
Table 1.4 reports the number of codeshare tickets sold by type. It shows that 58.18
percent of Delta codeshare products are virtual in nature. Virtual codeshare tickets represent
85.60 percent and 76.91 percent of Northwest and Continental codeshare product offerings
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Table 1.3: Airlines Involved in Codeshare Products
Code Airline
% of codeshare
products
UA United Air Lines 26.64
NW Northwest Airlines 21.21
US US Airways 19.28
CO Continental Air Lines 14.96
AA American Airlines 5.70
AS Alaska Airlines 3.89
TZ ATA Airlines 3.64
DL Delta Air Lines 2.74
FL AirTran Airways 1.86
F9 Frontier Airlines 0.08
100.00
Table 1.4: Frequency of Codeshare Tickets
Code Airline Number of tickets
%
virtual
Traditional Virtual Total
UA United Air Lines 528 1,076 1,604 67.08
NW Northwest Airlines 184 1,093 1,277 85.60
US US Airways 196 965 1,161 83.12
CO Continental Air Lines 208 693 901 76.91
AA American Airlines 221 122 343 35.57
AS Alaska Airlines 77 157 234 67.09
ATA ATA Airlines 205 14 219 6.39
DL Delta Air Lines 69 96 165 58.18
FL AirTran Airways 102 10 112 8.93
F9 Frontier Airlines 0 5 5 100.00
Total 1,790 4,231 6,021
Note: Data are from the third and fourth quarters of 2002 and 2004, U.S. Bureau of Transporta-
tion Statistics DB1B database. Data include round-trip, coach-class tickets with less than three
intermediate stops per itinerary.
respectively. In Table 1.5, we summarize our data according to the three types of air travel
product groupings described in Section 1.4.1. We denote a connection between two flights
with an arrow. For example, DL/DL→ DL/DL denotes a connecting itinerary between two
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Table 1.5: Classification of Cooperative Agreements in Data Set
Observations Passengers
Product Classification Example Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1. Pure online DL/DL → DL/DL 147,773 96.09 22,603,001 98.99
2. Virtual codeshare DL/NW → DL/NW 4,231 2.75 177,286 0.78
3. Traditional codeshare DL/DL → DL/NW 1,790 1.16 51,403 0.23
Total 153,794 100.00 22,831,690 100.00
Note: Data are from the third and fourth quarters of 2002 and 2004, U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics DB1B database. Data
include round-trip, coach-class tickets with less than three intermediate stops per itinerary. Examples denote connecting itineraries
between marketing carrier i.e. Delta (DL) and operating carrier(s)—DL and NW.
flights in which both the marketing and operating carrier is Delta Air Lines.
Likewise, DL/NW → DL/NW denotes a connecting itinerary where both segments are
marketed by Delta and both segments operated by NW. Finally DL/DL→ DL/NW denotes
a connecting itinerary between two flights in which the marketing carrier for both segments
is Delta which also operates the first leg of the trip and NW operates the second segment
of the trip.
Our working sample shows that, of the 153,794 itineraries, close to 4 percent—accounting
for .23 million passengers—involve at least one code-shared segment. Table 1.5 shows that
the overwhelming majority of passengers—about 99 percent—in our sample travel on pure
online itineraries. This is expected and consistent with the literature8 since whenever an
operating carrier is involved in a virtual code-shared product with a given ticketing carrier
in a market, the same ticketing carrier is probably offering its own pure online product in
the same market. Importantly, we observe that among code-shared itineraries, virtual code
sharing is twice more prevalent than traditional code sharing.
Figure 1.4 shows the increase in code sharing activity over the sample time span, third
and fourth quarters of 2002 and 2004, and consistent with Tables 1.4 and 1.5, airline carriers
show an apparent inclination to engage more in virtual as opposed to traditional code
8See Ito and Lee (2007)
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sharing.
Figure 1.4: Frequency of Domestic Codeshare Tickets, 2002:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4
Table 1.6 presents the summary statistics for variables used in our demand estimation.
The price variable is measured in constant year 1999 U.S. dollars. The Origin Presence
variable represents the number of cities an airline serves from any given origin city with
direct origin-destination flights. Thus, on average, airlines serve approximately 28 distinct
cities with direct flights from the market origin city. We describe the rest of the variables
in Table 1.7 and in the demand model section (1.5.1).
1.5 The Model
Air travel demand is specified based on a discrete choice framework. The estimation of air
travel demand is of particular interest since it permits us to confirm whether consumers’
choice behavior is consistent with our presumption that the better the routing quality, the
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price(a) 162.36 59.5342 27.11 1,593.51
Quantity 148.4563 457.616 9 12,349
Observed Product Share .000221 .00085 1.04e-06 .0482414
Origin presence 28.0691 26.9782 0 145
Destination presence 28.0480 26.9259 0 146
Nonstop (dummy variable) .150 .357 0 1
Itinerary distance flown (miles)(b) 1,542.992 701.483 67 4,084
Nonstop flight distance (miles) 1,364.168 653.058 67 2,724
Routing Quality(c) .8853 .1291 .3388 1
Traditional Codeshare .012 .107 0 1
Virtual Codeshare .028 .164 0 1
Pure Online 0.96 0.194 0 1
N comp nonstop 2.367 2.575 0 21
N comp connect 15.092 12.407 0 96
Number of Products 153,794
Number of Markets(d) 11,534
(a) Adjusted for inflation
(b) Reported as “market miles flown” in the DB1B database
(c) Defined as the ratio of non-stop distance to itinerary distance
(d) A market is an origin-destination-time period combination
more desirable the itinerary to the passenger. Following Chen and Gayle (2013), we estimate
pre-alliance cross-price elasticities of demand between any pair of the three alliance partners
in markets where they directly competed. These cross-price elasticities gauge the pre-alliance
competition intensity among the alliance partners in various markets. We later estimate a
reduced-form regression of routing quality to identify the alliance routing quality effects.
1.5.1 Demand
The nested logit model is used to specify air travel demand. Here, a typical passenger i
may either buy one of J products (air travel products), j = 1, . . . , J or otherwise choose the
outside good 0 (j = 0), for example driving or using another transportation means. Thus,
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passenger i makes a choice among Jmt + 1 alternatives in market m during time period
t. The nested logit model classifies products into G groups, and one additional group for
the outside good. Therefore, products are organized into G + 1 mutually exclusive groups.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the choice set faced by a typical passenger. Note that a group is a set
of products offered by an airline within a market.
Figure 1.5: The Choice Set
The passenger solves the following utility maximization problem:
Max
j∈{0,1,··· ,Jmt}
Uijmt = δjmt + σςimtg + (1− σ)εijmt (1.1)
δjmt = xjmtβ + αpjmt + ηj + υt + originm + destm + ξjmt (1.2)
where Uijmt is passenger i’s utility from choosing product j; δjmt is the mean level of utility
across passengers that choose product j; ςimtg represents a random component of utility
common across all products within the same group; εijmt is an independently and identically
distributed (across products, consumers, markets and time) random error term assumed to
have an extreme value distribution.
In Equation (1.2), xjmt represents a vector of observed non-price product characteristics
described below; pjmt is the price; ηj captures airline-specific fixed effects; υt captures time
period fixed effects; originm and destm are origin and destination city fixed effects and
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ξjmt, the unobserved (by the researcher) component of product characteristics that affects
consumer utility.
The vector xjmt includes Routing Quality
9, Origin Presence, which is a measure of
the size of an airlines airport presence, product-level zero-one codeshare dummy variables
(traditional and virtual codeshare) and a zero-one dummy variable that equals to unity only
if the product uses a nonstop flight to get passengers from the origin to destination. The
origin city presence variable is measured by the number of different cities an airline provides
service to using nonstop flights from the relevant market origin to destination cities.
The vector β measures the passenger’s marginal utilities associated with the product
characteristics. The parameter α captures the marginal utility of price. The parameter
σ lies between 0 and 1 and measures the correlation of consumer utility across products
belonging to the same airline. The correlation of preferences increases as σ approaches 1.
In the case where σ is equal to 0, the model collapses to the standard logit model where
products compete symmetrically. For notational convenience, we drop the market and time
subscripts to complete the derivation of the model.
Let there be Gg products in group g. If product j is in group g, then the conditional
probability of choosing product j given that group g is chosen, is given by:
Sj/g =
e(1−σ)
−1δj
Dg
where, Dg =
∑
j∈Gg
e(1−σ)
−1δj (1.3)
The probability of choosing group g or group g’s predicted share is given by:
Sg =
D1−σg
D1−σ0 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
(1.4)
The outside good is the only good in group 0. Therefore, D1−σ0 = e
δ0 . We normalize
9Note that including Routing Quality in our demand model is paramount since a positive estimate on
this variable would empirically validate that consumers’ choice behavior is consistent with the fact that
better routing quality is associated with a more desirable itinerary.
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the mean utility of the outside good to zero. This implies D1−σ0 = 1. Equation (1.4) can be
rewritten as:
Sg =
D1−σg
1 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
(1.5)
The unconditional probability of choosing product j or the market share of product j is:
Sj = Sj/g × Sg = e
(1−σ)−1δj
Dg
× D
1−σ
g
1 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
or Sj =
e(1−σ)
−1δj
Dσg
[
1 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
] (1.6)
Therefore, the demand for product j is given by:
dj = M × Sj(x,p, ξ;α, β, σ) (1.7)
where M is a measure of market size—the population in the origin city. The predicted
market share of product j is Sj while x, p and ξ are vectors of observed non-price product
characteristics, price, and the unobserved vector of product characteristics. α, β and σ are
parameters to be estimated. The estimation strategy of the demand parameters (α, β, σ)
is such that the observed market shares Sjmt are equal to the market shares predicted by
the model Sjmt. Empirical industrial organization shows that the model presented above
results in a linear equation:
ln(Sjmt)− ln(S0mt) = xjmtβ−αpjmt +σln(Sjmt/g) + ηj + υt + originm + destm + ξjmt (1.8)
where Sjmt is the observed within group share of product j computed from the data by
Sjmt =
qjmt
M
where qjmt is the quantity of air travel product j sold and M is the population
of the origin city. S0mt = 1−
∑
j∈Jm Sjmt is the observed share of the outside good. Sjmt/g
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is the observed within-group share of product j and the other variables are described as
in equation (1.2). Equation (1.8) can be estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
since price pjmt and Sjmt/g are endogenous.
The instruments we use for the 2SLS estimation are: (1) number of competitors’ products
in the market; (2) number of competing products offered by other airlines with an equivalent
number of intermediate stops; (3) number of other products offered by an airline in a
market; and (4) average number of intermediate stops across products offered by an airline
in a market. The rationale for using these instruments is discussed in Gayle (2007, 2013)
Instruments (1) - (3) are motivated by supply theory, which predicts that a product’s price
and within-group product share are affected by changes in its markup. Instruments (1) and
(2) capture the degree of competition facing a product, which in turn affects the size of a
product’s markup. The use of instrument (3) is justified by the fact that, all else constant,
as an airline offers more substitute products in a given market, the more capable the airline
is to charge a higher markup on each of these products. The intuition for instrument (4) is
as follows. Since we are using the nested logit demand model, we group products by airline.
So, instrument (4) is likely to be correlated with the within group share because passengers
may prefer a set of products offered by a particular airline to other airlines’ products owing
to differences in number of intermediate stops associated with the products.
1.5.2 Routing Quality Equation
To evaluate the effects of the Delta/Northwest/Continental alliance on the routing quality of
the alliance firms’ products, we use a reduced-form regression of Routing Quality. Possible
alliance effects on routing quality are identified using a difference-in-differences strategy.
This strategy enables us to compare pre-post alliance periods’ changes in routing quality
of products offered by the alliance firms, relative to changes in routing quality of products
offered by non-alliance firms over the same pre-post alliance periods. Given that the alliance
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was formed in August 2003, we use the third and fourth quarters of 2002 as the pre-alliance
period while the third and fourth quarters of 2004 are used as the post-alliance period.
The empirical model specification in equation (1.9) is similar to that used by Chen and
Gayle (2013)10 .The baseline reduced-form specification of the Routing Quality equation is
as follows and variables are defined in Table 1.7:
Routing Qualityjmt =
θ0 + θ1OriginPresencejmt + θ2DestinationPresencejmt
+θ3NonStopF lightDistancejmt + θ4N comp connectjmt
+θ5N comp nonstopjmt + θ6T
dnc
t + θ7DNCjmt + θ8T
dnc
t ×DNCjmt
+ηj + υt + originm + destm + µjmt
(1.9)
In equation (1.9), while the presence variables are supposed to control for the size of an
airline’s presence at the endpoint airports of the market, the NonStopF lightDistance vari-
able controls for the effect of distance between the origin and destination. N comp connect
and N comp nonstop are used to control for the level of product-type-specific competition
faced by a given product in a market.
The coefficient on T dnct in equation (1.9), θ6, explains how routing quality of products
offered by airlines other than Delta, Northwest or Continental changes over the DL/NW/CO
pre-post alliance periods. θ7, which is the coefficient on DNCjmt, tells us whether the routing
quality of Delta, Northwest or Continental products systematically differs from the routing
quality of products offered by other airlines. θ8, the coefficient on the interaction variable
T dnct ×DNCjmt, identifies whether routing quality of products offered by any of the alliance
carriers changed differently relative to routing quality changes of products offered by other
airlines over the DL/NW/CO pre- and post-alliance periods. Thus, θ8 captures changes in
routing quality in DL/NW/CO products due to the alliance.
10They used this model specification to identify merger quality effects. Furthermore, using almost identical
specifications to Chen and Gayle (2013) makes it easy to the reader to compare results across papers
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Table 1.7: Description of Routing Quality Determinants
Variable Definition
Routing quality Itinerary’s direct distance divided by the travel’s distance
Origin presence
Number of cities an airline serves from origin city
with direct origin & destination (O&D) flights
Destination presence
Number of cities an airline serves with direct O&D flights
going into the destination city.
Nonstop Flight Distance Direct flight distance (in miles)
N comp connect
Number of connecting itineraries offered by an airline’s
competitors in the market
N comp nonstop
Number of direct itineraries offered by an airline’s
competitors in the market
T dnct
Time period dummy variable, equals unity for
post-alliance period.
DNCjmt
Dummy for products marketed and operated by Delta, Northwest
and Continental or any combination of the alliance carriers
MKT dncbm
Market-specific dummy variable, equals unity for O&D
markets in which any two of three alliance carriers competed
(each offering their own substitute products) prior to alliance.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 Demand Results
We estimate the demand equation (1.8) and report the results in Table 1.8. As mentioned
above, price and within-group product shares Sjmt/g are endogenous variables in the demand
equation. Thus, OLS estimation in column 1 of Table 1.8 produces biased and inconsistent
estimates of the price coefficient and σ. We re-estimate the demand equation using 2SLS
and perform a Hausman exogeneity test. The Hausman test rejects the exogeneity of price
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and within-group product share at conventional levels of statistical significance. First-
stage reduced-form regressions where we regress pjmt and ln(Sjmt/g) against the instruments
suggest that the instruments explain variations in the endogenous variables. We find that the
R2 measures for the regressions of price against the instruments and within-group product
share against the instruments are 0.0544 and 0.4202 respectively. While we control for
carrier-specific effects in both models, we suppress the estimates in Table 1.8 for brevity
and since the use of instruments is justified, we only discuss the 2SLS estimates. The
coefficient estimate on the price variable has the expected sign. Thus, an increase in the
product’s price reduces the probability that a typical passenger will choose the product.
The coefficient estimate on ln(Sjmt/g), which is an estimate of σ should lie between
zero and one. σ measures the correlation of consumers’ preferences for products offered
for sale by the same airline. Here, the estimate is 0.1088 and is closer to zero indicating
that passenger’s choice behavior shows weak levels of brand loyalty to airlines. Airlines use
customer loyalty programs to strengthen relationships with their customers but as pointed
by Dowling and Uncles (1997), the launch of a loyalty program does not provide exceptional
advantages mostly when any potential gain differential can be quickly eroded by competitive
forces. This might explain the weak level of brand loyalty.
The importance of serving a large number of non-stop routes out of a given city is mea-
sured by the Origin Presence variable. The positive coefficient estimate on Origin Presence
shows that, ceteris paribus, more customers choose airlines that have large operations out
of the origin city. Similar findings were obtained by Chen and Gayle (2013) Gayle and Le
(2013) and Berry (1990) among others. A possible explanation has to do with benefits of
marketing devices such as frequent-flyer programs.
The positive coefficient estimate on the Nonstop variable suggests that direct flights are
associated with higher levels of utility compared to connecting flights. Thus, ceteris paribus,
passengers prefer products with nonstop flight itineraries to those with intermediate stop(s)
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Table 1.8: Demand Estimation
Regressors OLS 2SLS
Price .000741*** – .01165***
(.00004) (.00051)
ln(Sjmt/g) .537825*** .10882***
(.00175) (.00659)
Origin Presence .01238*** .00959***
(.00011) (.00023)
Nonstop Dummy .82532*** 1.12242***
(.00705) (.01077)
Routing Quality 1.78093*** 1.93739***
(.01894) (.02704)
Traditional Codeshare – .30573*** – .66719***
(.02045) (.02925)
Virtual Codeshare – .70304*** – .97949***
(.01342) (.02055)
Constant – 10.4485*** – 9.0109***
(.03101) (.08215)
Carrier Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Quarter and Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Market Origin fixed effects Yes Yes
Market Destination fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.6964 0.4013
Endogeneity Test. H0: Price and ln(Sjmt/g) are exogenous
Wu-Hausman: F(2, 153652)= 3371.11*** (p = 0.0000)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
when traveling from origin to destination. Furthermore, consumers are willing to pay up to
$96.35 extra,11 on average, to obtain a product with a nonstop itinerary in order to avoid
products with intermediate stop(s).
Consumers show preference for products with itinerary fight distances as close as possible
11This is obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate on the Nonstop dummy variable by the coefficient
estimate on Price.
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to the nonstop flight distance between the origin and destination. This result is explained
by the positive coefficient estimate on the Routing Quality variable and underscores our
premise that consumers’ choice behavior is consistent with the fact that better routing
quality is associated with a more passenger-desirable itinerary. Furthermore, consumers are
willing to pay up to $2.38 extra,12 on average, for each percentage point increase that the
nonstop flight distance is of the actual itinerary flight distance.
The demand effects of each type of code sharing are identified by interpreting the co-
efficient estimates on the codeshare variables (Traditional and V irtual). The coefficient
estimates on codeshare variables measure utility differentials vis-a`-vis the Pure Online prod-
uct type. The negative coefficient estimates strongly suggest that traditional and virtual
code sharing result in lower consumer utility levels. A drawback of a code-shared product,
unlike a pure online product, is the change in operating carrier(s) across trip segments (tra-
ditional) or that the ticketing carrier differs from the operating carrier (virtual). Consumers
may perceive the cooperation between two carriers less attractive than flying on a single
airline. The demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity of demand estimate of −2.03.
This estimate falls well within the range for estimated own-price elasticity of demand in the
airline industry. In fact, Berry and Jia (2010) find own-price elasticity estimates ranging
from −1.89 to −2.10 while Gayle and Wu (2011)’s estimates range from −1.65 to −2.39.
In the spirit of Chen and Gayle (2013), we estimate mean cross-price elasticities of
demand between any two of the three alliance partners in the pre-alliance period. The de-
mand model yields mean cross-price elasticity of demand estimates of 0.00021 between Delta
and Northwest products, 0.000197 between Delta and Continental products, and 0.000165
between Northwest and Continental products. We later use the cross-price elasticities of
demand to proxy the intensity of pre-alliance competition between alliance firms’ products.
This competition intensity measure is essential for the formulation and estimation of our
12This is obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate on the Routing Quality variable by the coefficient
estimate on Price.
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disaggregated reduced-form routing quality equation (1.10) specified in section 1.7.
1.6.2 Routing Quality Results - Aggregated Analysis
Table 1.9 presents coefficient estimates of the reduced-form routing quality equation (1.9).
There are 2 columns of coefficient estimates. Coefficient estimates in the first column corre-
spond to the baseline model, and those in the second column, evaluate how routing quality
changes in markets the alliance partners competed prior to the alliance. The coefficient
estimate of the constant term across specifications is approximately 0.86. This means that,
assuming all determinants of routing quality in the regressions are held at zero, the mean
routing quality measure across all products in the sample is approximately 0.86. Thus,
nonstop flight distances between origin cities and destination cities are on average 86% of
the flight distances associated with product itineraries used by passengers in the sample
markets.
Presence variables : The effects on routing quality of serving a large number of non-stop
routes into and out of a given city is measured by the Destination and Origin Presence
variables, respectively. The positive coefficient estimates on both presence variables show
that, ceteris paribus, for each additional city that an airline connects to either endpoints of
a market using nonstop service, routing quality of the airline’s products within the market
will increase by approximately 0.06%.
Nonstop distance : The positive coefficient estimate on this variable indicates that products
with longer nonstop flight distance between a market’s origin and destination, tend to have
better routing quality.
Number of competing products with intermediate stop(s) in a market: The negative co-
efficient estimate on N comp connect indicates that the higher the number of competing
products with intermediate stop(s) a given product faces, the better its routing quality.
Number of competing non-stop products in a market: The coefficient estimate on N comp nonstop
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Table 1.9: Routing Quality Estimation: Aggregated Analysis
Regressors Specification 1 Specification 2
Constant .8562*** .8614***
(.0041) (.0041)
Origin Presence .00058*** .00057***
(.000014) (.000014)
Destination Presence .00058*** .00057***
(.000014) (.000014)
Nonstop Distance .000069*** .00007***
(7.76e-07) (9.07e-07)
N comp connect – .00038*** – .0004***
(.00005) (.00005)
N comp nonstop – .00017 – .0002
(.0002) (.0002)
DNCjmt – .1383*** – .1367***
(.00212) (.00211)
T dnct .00356*** .00359***
(.00075) (.00075)
T dnct ×DNCjmt – .00259*** – .0165***
(.00118) (.00348)
MKT dnc – .0277***
(.00151)
T dnct ×DNCjmt ×MKT dnc .0144***
(.00341)
Carrier Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Quarter and Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Market Origin fixed effects Yes Yes
Market Destination fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.2457 0.2474
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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is not significant, implying that there on significant effect on the routing quality of a product
as the product faces increasing number of products with no intermediate stops.
1.6.3 Persistent Differences in Routing Quality of Products of-
fered by the Alliance Partners
These persistent differences in routing quality are captured by the coefficient estimate (ap-
proximately −14%) on the DNC dummy variable. This suggests that ceteris paribus,
the mean routing quality of products offered by Delta, Northwest and Continental is 14
points less than the mean routing quality across all products in the sample. Holding all
determinants of routing quality at their sample mean values, the mean routing quality
measure of DL/NW/CO products is 0.8359.13 Thus, nonstop flight distances between ori-
gins and destinations are on average only 83.59% of the flight distances associated with
Delta/Northwest/Continental product itineraries used by passengers.
1.6.4 Routing Quality Effects of the DL/NW/CO Alliance
The positive coefficient estimate on T dnct indicates that routing quality of products offered by
airlines other than Delta, Northwest and Continental increased by 0.36% above the sample
mean routing quality from pre- to post-alliance periods. In other words, non-DL/NW/CO
itinerary flight distances decreased relative to nonstop flight distances by 0.36% over the
relevant pre-post alliance periods.
The coefficient estimate on the interaction variable T dnct ×DNCjmt represents the difference-
in-differences estimate that identifies whether routing quality of products offered by any of
13This is computed using specification 1:
RoutingQualitydnc = .8562 − .1383 + 0.00058(28.4106) + 0.00058(28.2689) + 0.000069(1321.997) −
0.00038(14.898)− 0.00017(2.295)
where the numbers in parentheses are means of the regressors for DL/NW/CO products, while the other
numbers are the coefficient estimates.
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the allied carriers changed differently relative to routing quality changes of products offered
by other airlines over the DL/NW/CO pre- and post-alliance periods. It captures changes
in routing quality in DL/NW/CO products due to the alliance. The estimate is negative,
suggesting that the alliance caused the mean routing quality in DL/NW/CO products to
fall over the pre- and post-alliance periods. However, over the pre-post alliance periods,
routing quality of products offered by the Delta/Northwest/Continental trio witnessed a
net increase of 0.097% (0.356%−0.259%) even though this increase is less than the increase
in routing quality witnessed by the other airline by 0.259%.
1.6.5 Routing Quality Effects based on Existence of Pre-alliance
Competition between Alliance Firms
As defined in table 1.7, MKT dnc is a market-specific dummy variable that equals unity for
origin and destination markets in which any two of the three alliance partners competed
prior to the alliance. MKT dnc is used in specification (2) in the second column of Table 1.9.
We include this dummy variable to find out whether the alliance effects on routing quality
differ in markets where the alliance partners competed prior to the alliance. Our dataset
shows that there is a total of 2896 directional origin-destination combinations prior to the
DL/NW/CO alliance. Table 1.10 shows that all three carriers simultaneously competed in
1624 (56.1%) of these directional origin-destination combinations prior to the alliance.
Table 1.10: Number of overlapping directional O&D combinations with pre-alliance competition
Number of O&Ds
Delta Air Lines (DL) / Northwest Airlines (NW) 1,924
Delta Air Lines (DL) / Continental Air Lines (CO) 1,896
Northwest Airlines (NW) / Continental Air Lines (CO) 1,669
Delta Air Lines (DL) / Northwest Airlines (NW) / Continental Air Lines (CO) 1,624
The effects of the DL/NW/CO alliance on routing quality in markets where the alliance
firms competed before the alliance is determined by summing the coefficients on interaction
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variables T dnct × DNCjmt and T dnct × DNCjmt ×MKT dnc in Specification 2 (column 2 in
Table 1.9). Specification 2 suggests that the DL/NW/CO alliance is associated with 0.21%
(| − 0.0165 + 0.0144|) decline in routing quality of products offered by the alliance firms
in the markets where they competed with each other prior to their alliance. This result
is consistent with the premise that routing quality decreases in markets where the alliance
firms competed prior to alliance because of the decrease in competitive pressure.
Our structural demand estimates from equation (1.8) can be used to monetize consumer
welfare effects of the routing quality decrease associated with the DL/NW/CO alliance. We
estimate in section (1.6.1) that consumers are willing to pay $2.38 extra, on average, for
each percentage point increase that the nonstop flight distance is of the actual itinerary
flight distance.
So, in markets where the alliance firms competed prior to the alliance, routing quality
effects of the alliance imply that each consumer’s utility falls by an average of $0.5 (= 0.21×
$2.38).14 These consumer welfare effects can be substantial given the origin city population
sizes in our sample. The coefficient estimate on the interaction variable T dnct ×DNCjmt in
Specification 2 of Table 1.9 captures the alliance routing quality effects in markets where the
alliance partners did not compete prior to the alliance. Evidence shows that each consumer
experienced a fall in utility as a result of routing quality deterioration equivalent to $3.93
(= 1.65× $2.38).
14As pointed out by Chen and Gayle (2013), this method of calculating welfare effects fails to consider
second-order welfare effects that can occur due to routing quality influencing other variables such as price
that in turn may affect welfare.
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1.7 Routing Quality Equation: Disaggregated Analy-
sis
To allow for the possibility that the market effects of an alliance may depend on the identity
of the partner carriers code sharing a given product, we replace the product-specific dummy
variable (DNCjmt) in equation (1.9) with three variables: DNjmt, DCjmt and NCjmt. Recall
that DNCjmt is a dummy variable equals to 1 for itineraries marketed and operated by
one or any combination of the alliance firms. We define the three variables as follows:
DNjmt is a dummy variable equals to 1 for products marketed and operated by Delta and
Northwest, whereas DCjmt equals 1 for products marketed and operated by Delta and
Continental. Similarly, NCjmt equals 1 for products marketed and operated by Northwest
and Continental. Therefore, DNjmt is a dummy variable for code-shared products between
Delta and Northwest, DCjmt is a dummy variable for code-shared products between Delta
and Continental. NCjmt is analogously defined if the product is codeshared by Northwest
and Continental.
The above disaggregation is important in two aspects. First, it permits us to identify
routing quality changes in markets where two of the three partner carriers competed prior
to the alliance. This is relevant because Northwest and Continental have been operating
as codeshare partners since their 1998 codeshare agreement and were joined by Delta in
August 2003. Secondly, this pairwise disaggregation makes it convenient to use our measure
of pre-alliance competition intensity since cross-price elasticities of demand can only be
computed for a pair of firms. So, measures of pre-alliance competition intensity will clearly
vary across markets. Consequently, the sign on DNCjmt in equation (1.9) is ambiguous a
priori since it might be capturing the overall routing quality effect on DL/NW/CO products
whereby masking existing pairwise competitive effects among the alliance firms. As such the
prevailing total effect on routing quality may depend on the degree of competition intensity
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among any pair of the alliance partners.
The baseline model for our disaggregated analysis is specified as follows:
Routing Qualityjmt =
θ0 + θ1OriginPresencejmt + θ2DestinationPresencejmt
+θ3NonStopF lightDistancejmt + θ4N comp connectjmt
+θ5N comp nonstopjmt + θ6T
dnc
t + φ1DNjmt + φ2DCjmt
+φ3NCjmt + φ4T
dnc
t ×DNjmt + φ5T dnct ×DCjmt + φ6T dnct ×NCjmt
+ηj + υt + originm + destm + µjmt
(1.10)
To identify whether routing quality of products offered by any pair of alliance firms
changed differently relative to routing quality changes of products offered by other airlines
over the pre- and post-alliance periods, we interact the variables DNjmt, DCjmt and NCjmt
with the time period dummy variable T dnct which equals unity for post-alliance period.
1.7.1 Routing Quality Results: Disaggregated Analysis
Table 1.11 reports the results of the disaggregated model in equation (1.10). There are 4
columns, each representing a different specification of equation (1.10). The first column re-
ports the baseline specification and the other three columns incrementally assess how various
factors influence the routing quality change from each pair of alliance partners. Since the
coefficient estimates on measured determinants of Routing Quality across specifications are
similar to those in Table 1.9, we start by focusing our attention on the persistent differences
in routing quality of products offered by each pair of the alliance partners.
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Table 1.11: Routing Quality Estimation - Disaggregated Analysis
Regressors Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
Constant .8347*** .8366*** .8374*** .8377***
(.00397) (.00398) (.00398) (.00398)
Origin Presence .00057*** .00056*** .00055*** .00055***
(.000014) (.000014) (.000014) (.000014)
Destination Presence .00058*** .00057*** .00056*** .00056***
(.000014) (.000014) (.000014) (.000014)
Nonstop Distance .000069*** .000075*** .000075*** .000075***
(7.76e-07) (9.00e-07) (9.00e-07) (9.00e-07)
N comp connect – .00032*** – .00030*** – .00028*** – .00029***
(.000047) (.000047) (.000047) (.000047)
N comp nonstop – .00023 – .00057 – .00061 – .00059
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
T dnct .0034*** .0035*** .0035*** .0035***
(.00075) (.00075) (.00075) (.00075)
DNjmt – .04382*** – .04380*** – .04370*** – .04361***
(.00138) (.00138) (.00138) (.00138)
DCjmt – .0575*** – .0568*** – .0569*** – .0570***
(.00139) (.00139) (.00140) (.00140)
NCjmt – .08714*** – .0859*** – .0860*** – .0860***
(.00142) (.00143) (.00143) (.00143)
MKT dnbm – .00256* – .00250* – .00234
(.00146) (.00146) (.00146)
MKT dcbm – .00723*** – .00758*** – .00782***
(.0014) (.0014) (.0014)
MKT ncbm – .00907*** – .00902*** – .00893***
(.00154) (.00154) (.00154)
T dnct ×DNjmt – .00241*** – .01552*** – .01525*** – .01546***
(.0015) (.0028) (.0029) (.0029)
T dnct ×DCjmt – .00688*** – .00994*** – .00953*** – .00922***
(.0015) (.00283) (.00283) (.00283)
T dnct ×NCjmt .00805*** – .0092*** – .0085*** – .00825***
(.0015) (.0027) (.0027) (.0027)
T dnct ×DNjmt ×MKT dn .0152 *** .0156*** .01586***
(.0026) (.0027) (.0027)
T dnct ×DCjmt ×MKT dc .0037 – .00026 – .00075
(.0026) (.0026) (.0028)
T dnct ×NCjmt ×MKT nc .0189*** .0171*** .0144***
(.0026) (.0026) (.0027)
T dnct ×DNjmt ×MKT dnbm × Ednbm – 4.5483*** – 6.901**
(1.6177) (2.9226)
T dnct ×DCjmt ×MKT dcbm × Edcbm 13.468*** 16.921***
(1.8891) (3.4705)
T dnct ×NCjmt ×MKT ncbm × Encbm 5.7119*** 20.4406***
(.1.2687) (2.4955)
T dnct ×DNjmt ×MKT dnbm × (Ednbm)2 475.4573
(495.9267)
T dnct ×DCjmt ×MKT dcbm × (Edcbm)2 – 810.4011
(706.189)
T dnct ×NCjmt ×MKT ncbm × (Encbm)2 – 1810.178***
(264.0295)
R2 0.2471 0.2484 0.2487 0.2490
The equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. Fixed effects are included in each specification but were not reported for brevity.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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The coefficient estimates on the dummy variables terms DNjmt, DCjmt and NCjmt are
approximately −0.044, −0.057 and −0.086 respectively, indicating that assuming all deter-
minants of routing quality in the regressions are held constant, the mean routing quality
measure of products offered by Delta and Northwest is 4.4 points less than the mean routing
quality measure across all products in the sample. The two other coefficient estimates can
be interpreted similarly for the DL/NW and NW/CO pairs. However, these results show
that the change in mean routing quality is largest for NW/CO products.15
The coefficient estimate on T dnct is positive and similar to the one in the aggregated
analysis, suggesting that the routing quality of products offered by airlines other than
Delta, Northwest or Continental increased by 0.34% above the sample average over the
DL/NW/CO pre-post alliance periods. Thus, non-DL/NW, non-DL/CO and non-NW/CO
itinerary flight distances decreased relative to nonstop flight distances by 0.34% over the
relevant pre-post alliance periods. The coefficient estimate on the three interaction variables
T dnct ×DNjmt, T dnct ×DCjmt and T dnct ×NCjmt represent the difference-in-differences esti-
mates that identify whether routing quality of products offered by any pair of the alliance
firms changed differently relative to routing quality changes of products offered by other
airlines over the DL/NW/CO pre- and post-alliance periods. It captures changes in routing
quality in DL/NW, DL/CO and NW/CO products respectively due to the alliance. The
estimate is negative for the first two carrier pairs, suggesting that the alliance caused their
products’ mean routing quality to fall over the pre- and post-alliance periods. However
NW/CO products mean routing quality actually increased by 0.81%.
In summary, coefficient estimates in Specification 1 of Table 1.11 suggest that overall,
across all markets in the sample, the airline pairs DL/NW and DL/CO are associated with
a decline in routing quality of their products, but the NW/CO pair is associated with an
increase in routing quality of its products. Given that these quality effects are likely to
15Perhaps because their strategic cooperation started in 1998, couple of years prior to the three-way
alliance.
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differ across markets based on certain pre-alliance characteristics of a market, we include
market-specific dummy variables to find out whether the alliance effects on routing quality
differ in markets where each of the carrier pairs competed prior to the three-way alliance. To
motivate this scenario, we present the number of directional O&D combinations where each
carrier pair directly competed prior to the three-way alliance in Table 1.10. The numbers
are substantial and specifications 2, 3 and 4 explore this scenario.
1.7.2 Alliance Effects on Routing Quality based on Existence of
Pre-alliance Competition between alliance Firms - Disag-
gregated Analysis
In specification 2 of Table 1.11, we include three zero-one market-specific dummy variables:
MKT dnbm, MKT
dc
bm and MKT
nc
bm. MKT
dn
bm takes the value of one only for origin-destination
markets in which Delta and Northwest competed prior to the alliance. Likewise MKT dcbm
takes the value of one only for origin-destination markets in which Delta and Continental
competed prior to the alliance and MKT ncbm is defined similarly for origin-destination markets
in which Northwest and Continental competed prior to the alliance.
The alliance-specific variables in specification 2 indicate that the DL/NW and DL/CO
carrier pairs are associated with 0.032% (| − 0.01552 + 0.0152|) and 0.994% (| − 0.00994|)
declines, respectively, in routing quality of products offered by the carriers in markets where
they competed directly prior to the alliance. However the NW/CO carrier pair witnessed
a 0.97% (| − 0.0092 + 0.0189|) increase in routing quality of products offered by NW and
CO in markets where they competed with each other prior to the alliance. These results
are obtained by summing the coefficients on the interaction variables T dnct × DNjmt and
T dnct × DNjmt ×MKT dnbm in the case of carrier pair DL/NW. We sum T dnct × DCjmt and
T dnct × DCjmt × MKT dcbm in the case of carrier pair DL/CO and finally for carrier pair
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NW/CO, we sum T dnct ×NCjmt and T dnct ×NCjmt ×MKT ncbm.
In our aggregated analysis, we can monetize the consumer welfare effects of routing qual-
ity changes associated with the DL/NW/CO alliance using our structural demand estimates
from equation (1.8). We recall from section (1.6.1) that consumers are willing to pay $2.38
extra, on average, for each percentage point increase that the nonstop flight distance is of the
actual itinerary flight distance. Therefore, in markets where the carrier pairs competed prior
to the alliance, routing quality effects of the alliance imply that each consumer’s utility falls
by an average of $0.08 (= 0.032×$2.38) in the case for DL/NW and $2.37 (= 0.994×$2.38)
in the case for DL/CO. However, in the case of NW/CO, each consumer’s utility actually
increases by an average of $2.38 (= 0.97× $2.38).
The coefficient estimates on the interaction variables T dnct ×DNjmt, T dnct ×DCjmt and
T dnct × NCjmt in specification 2 in Table 1.11 capture the alliance routing quality effects
in markets where the carrier pairs did not compete prior to the alliance. Evidence shows
that each consumer experiences a fall in utility as a result of routing quality deterioration
equivalent to $3.69 (= 1.552 × $2.38) in the case for DL/NW and $2.37 (= 0.994 × $2.38)
in the case for DL/CO and $2.20 (= 0.92× $2.38) in the case of NW/CO.
1.7.3 Alliance Effects on Routing Quality based on Pre-alliance
Competition Intensity between the Alliance Firms
Using our disaggregated model in equation (1.10), we examine whether the effect of an
alliance on product quality varies with the intensity of pre-alliance competition16 between
products of the alliance firms. The estimated demand model was used to compute pre-
alliance cross-price elasticities between Delta and Northwest products, Delta and Continen-
tal products and Northwest and Continental products. The variables Ednbm, E
dc
bm and E
nc
bm
denote pre-alliance cross-price elasticities of demand between Delta and Northwest prod-
16Measured using cross-price elasticity of demand
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ucts, Delta and Continental products and Northwest and Continental products, respectively.
The elasticities in each of these variables vary across origin-destination markets in which
the firms forming the pair directly competed prior to the three-way alliance. A cross-price
elasticity between the firms’ products will only exist in markets where they are competitors
prior to the alliance. The pre-alliance cross-elasticity variables discussed above are used to
construct the following interaction variables:
T dnct ×DNjmt ×MKT dnbm × Ednbm (1.11)
T dnct ×DNjmt ×MKT dnbm × (Ednbm)2 (1.12)
T dnct ×DCjmt ×MKT dcbm × Edcbm (1.13)
T dnct ×DCjmt ×MKT dcbm × (Edcbm)2 (1.14)
T dnct ×NCjmt ×MKT ncbm × Encbm (1.15)
T dnct ×NCjmt ×MKT ncbm × (Encbm)2 (1.16)
We incrementally add these variables to the routing quality regression to obtain Speci-
fications 3 and 4 in Table 1.11.
Delta/Northwest Pair: The segment of the regression equation in Specification 4 that
relates to routing quality effects of the Delta/Northwest pair in markets where they directly
competed prior to the alliance is given by:
∆RoutingQualitydn = −0.01546 + 0.01586− 6.901(Ednbm) (1.17)
where the variables T dnct , DNjmt and MKT
dn
bm each takes the value of one. The term (E
dn
bm)
2
was suppressed because of statistical insignificance. This sign pattern of the coefficients
in equation (1.17) suggests that the Delta/Northwest pair increased routing quality of its
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products when the pre-alliance competition intensity is less than 0.000058
(−0.01546+0.01586
6.901
)
in markets where the two airlines directly competed in prior to the alliance. For pre-alliance
competition intensity values above 0.000058, routing quality for Delta/Northwest products
decreases in all markets they competed prior to the alliance.
Delta/Continental Pair: The segment of the regression equation in Specification 4 that
relates to routing quality effects of the Delta/Continental pair in markets where they directly
competed prior to the alliance is given by:
∆RoutingQualitydc = −0.00922 + 0.00075 + 16.921(Edcbm) (1.18)
where the variables T dnct , DCjmt and MKT
dc
bm each takes the value of one. The term (E
dc
bm)
2
was suppressed because of statistical insignificance. This sign pattern of the coefficients in
equation (1.18) suggests that the Delta/Continental pair decreased routing quality of its
products when the pre-alliance competition intensity is less than 0.00059
(−0.00922+0.00075
16.921
)
in
markets where the two airlines directly competed in prior to the alliance. For pre-alliance
competition intensity values above 0.00059, routing quality for Delta/Continental products
increases in markets they competed prior to the alliance.
The Northwest/Continental Pair: The segment of the regression equation in Specifica-
tion 4 that relates to routing quality effects of the Northwest/Continental Pair in markets
where they directly competed prior to the alliance is given by:
∆RoutingQualitync = −0.00922 + 0.00075 + 16.921(Encbm)− 1810.179(Encbm)2 (1.19)
where the variables T dnct , BCjmt and MKT
nc
bm each takes the value of one. This sign pattern
of the coefficients in equation (1.19) suggests the effect of the alliance on routing quality
varies in an inverted U-shaped manner with pre-alliance competition intensity (measured by
cross-elasticity) between the two airlines, where the maximum turning point in the inverted
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U-shaped relationship occurs at a cross-elasticity 0.0056
(
20.4406
2×1810.178
)
. Specifically, the alliance
appears to have increased routing quality more in markets where the pre-alliance cross-
elasticities between the two NW/CO products are lower, up to an intermediate pre-alliance
cross-elasticity of 0.0056. Markets with pre-alliance cross-elasticity between NW and CO of
0.0056, experienced the largest increase in routing quality of 6.39%.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the routing quality implications of the Delta, Northwest, Continental
codeshare alliance with a particular focus on the alliance effects in markets where the alliance
partners competed prior to the alliance.
Examining the alliance partners’ products altogether (aggregated analysis), the empirical
results show that the alliance decreased routing quality of DL/NW/CO products by 0.256%
below the mean routing quality of the entire sample products. More interestingly, the
alliance effects in specific markets where the alliance firms directly competed prior the
alliance, are also negatively associated with routing quality of the alliance firms’ products,
resulting in a fall in consumer’s utility of $0.5 per consumer. This result supports the
premise that routing quality decreases in markets where the alliance firms competed prior
to the alliance because of the decrease in competitive pressure in those markets.
We also investigate alliance partners in pairs (disaggregated analysis) to allow for the
possibility that the alliance effects in specific pre-alliance markets may differ depending on
the degree of pre-alliance competition intensity between the alliance firms. Based on the
entire sample, products offered by the carriers pairs DL/NW and DL/CO had a decrease
in routing quality due the alliance (0.24% and 0.69%, respectively). However, the NW/CO
pairs products witnessed a rise in routing quality of 0.81% due to the alliance. These results
are also true in markets where the carriers competed prior to the alliance.
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Chapter 2
Airline Code-sharing and its Effects
on On-Time Performance
2.1 Introduction
The public outcry and media coverage that ensued in the 1980s over increasing air traffic
delays attracted congressional attention on airline on-time performance (OTP). Since 1988,
the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
tracks the on-time performance of domestic flights operated by large air carriers. It is now
mandatory for airlines with at least one percent of all domestic traffic to disclose flight–by–
flight information on delays (Mayer and Sinai, 2003).
Interestingly, even with this flight-by-flight data disclosure, the DOT’s Office of Aviation
Enforcement and Proceedings1 showed that the most prevailing consumer air travel com-
plaint in the year 2000, stems from flight problems namely cancellations, delays and missed
connections. In fact, 1 out of 4 flights was either delayed, canceled or diverted (Rupp et al.,
2006). According to Mayer and Sinai (2003), in 2000, flights that arrived at their destination
1US Department Of Transportation Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings (2001). USD-
TOAEP Feb. 2001 p. 34
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within 15 minutes of their scheduled arrival time and without being canceled or diverted,
accounted for less than 70 percent.
Given the concerns over OTP and the recent trend of airline alliance formation as a
dominant feature of the airline industry, a new and interesting question is: how do airline
alliances affect partners’ OTP? Answering this question would shed light on whether the
recent emergence of airline alliances has made problems related to airline OTP better or
worse.
Airline alliances vary from limited cooperation, such as reciprocal frequent flyer pro-
grams, to more enhanced agreements, such as code sharing.2 A codeshare agreement (CSA)
is a reciprocal agreement between two or more airlines, through which one airline can sell
seats on its codeshare partners’ flights using its own reservation code.3
Airline alliance formation has a long history in the international air travel market but this
practice is a relatively new phenomenon among U.S. domestic carriers. Since the mid-1990s,
major airlines that serve the U.S. domestic market have increasingly found it appealing to
form alliances. In 1995, Northwest and Hawaiian Airlines announced their intention to
create an alliance (Ito and Lee, 2005) and in the first half of 1998, the six largest US
carriers4 followed suit with their own codeshare alliance proposals (Bamberger et al., 2001)
This practice proliferated with the implementation of subsequent alliance partnerships such
as Alaska/Hawaiian in October 2001, American West/Hawaiian in October 2002, United/US
Airways in January 2003 and Delta/Northwest/Continental in June 2003, among others.
For illustration purposes, a CSA between Alaska Airlines (AS) and Hawaiian Airlines
(HA) for instance, allows Alaska Airlines (referred to as the “ticketing carrier” or “marketing
carrier”) to market and sell seats on thousands of flights operated by Hawaiian Airlines
2US General Accounting Office (1999)
3The International Air Transport Association (IATA) uses two-character codes to identify all airlines;
for example the code DL is assigned to Delta Air Lines.
4Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines made alliance announcement in January 1998; Delta Air
Lines/United Airlines and American Airlines/US Airways followed in April 1998.
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(referred to as the “operating carrier”) and vice-versa. In this example, Alaska Airlines may
place its code (AS) on this Hawaiian’s flight and sell tickets for seats on this flight as if Alaska
Airlines operates the flight. So, this same flight will be listed twice in computer reservation
systems, once under Alaska Airlines’ code (AS) and again under Hawaiian Airlines’ code
(HA). Therefore, under a CSA, partner airlines are able to expand their flight offerings
without adding planes.
We make the following argument. Alliance partners typically coordinate in an attempt
to achieve seamless integration of their route networks, which potentially result in more
travel-convenient routing across partner carriers’ networks. The interdependence across
partner carriers’ networks caused by the alliance may in turn influence each partner’s OTP.
It is not clear a priori whether the alliance will improve or worsen a given partner’s OTP.
On the one hand, a carrier may have a greater incentive to provide better OTP when it
joins a codeshare alliance because its OTP not only affects the timeliness of connections
within its own network, but also affects the timeliness of connections between its network
with its partner carriers’ networks. On the other hand, a carriers’ OTP could worsen after
joining a codeshare alliance since an extra source of a carrier’s delay can be due to its
partner carriers’ delay. While not attempting to study the incentives to form an alliance,
the primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the net impact of a codeshare alliance on
partner carriers’ OTP.
Concerns over poor on-time performance may therefore be exacerbated or improved by
airline alliances. Few authors have explored and analyzed the relationship between airline
alliances and service quality, both theoretically and empirically. The empirical literature has
been largely inconclusive, with some studies suggesting that airline alliances increase product
quality (Hassin and Shy, 2004; Gayle and Thomas, 2015), others suggesting that airline
alliances decrease product quality (Gayle and Yimga, 2014; Goh and Uncles, 2003), and
some studies found no relationship between airline alliances and product quality (Tiernan
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et al., 2008; Tsantoulis and Palmer, 2008). At the center of these diverging empirical results,
reside two main issues: (1) the difficulty in defining quality in a way that is mathematically
tractable (Prince and Simon, 2009) and (2) the sensitivity of results to assumptions of a
particular theoretical model (Park, 1997).
With respect to the first issue, some measures of service quality have been explored.
Goh and Uncles (2003) empirically study the perceptions that business travelers have of the
benefits of global alliances. To measure quality, they use a cross-sectional self-completion
survey that was administered to a sample of Australian business travelers. Tsantoulis and
Palmer (2008) examine service quality effects of a co-brand alliance where service quality is
proxied by a quality index they constructed based on some technical and functional aspects
of quality. Gayle and Yimga (2014) empirically investigated the routing quality effects5
of the Delta/Northwest/Continental codeshare alliance, while Gayle and Thomas (2015)
investigated the routing quality effect of global alliances, antitrust immunity, and domestic
mergers.
Another service quality measure is an airline’s on-time performance. Almost no research
has been conducted to examine the impact of a codeshare alliance on the on-time perfor-
mance of its partner members. An exception is the work by Tiernan et al. (2008). They
investigate the service quality of E.U. and U.S. members of main airline alliances. Three
specific measures of airline service quality were used in their study: on-time flight arrival
percentage, percentage of flights not canceled and percentage of passengers filing baggage
reports (bags lost damaged, delayed or pilfered). Their examination of the international
airline alliances indicates no significant differences in the quality of service indicators.
Apart from Tiernan et al. (2008) who looked at the linkage between on-time performance
and airline alliance,6 most studies on on-time performance have focused on its relationship
5Routing Quality is defined as the ratio of nonstop fight distance to the product’s itinerary fight distance
used to get passengers from the origin to destination.
6Their study looked at international airline alliances which contrasts from ours, based on the U.S.
domestic air travel market.
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with competition (Mayer and Sinai, 2003; Mazzeo, 2003; Rupp et al., 2006), multimarket
contact (Prince and Simon, 2009), prices (Forbes, 2008) and entry or threat of entry (Prince
and Simon, 2014), among others.
To examine whether and how codeshare partners’ product quality provision change in
response to a codeshare agreement, we focus on the Delta Air Lines (DL), Northwest Airlines
(NW) and Continental Airlines (CO) Codeshare Alliance. We choose this codeshare alliance
for the following reasons: (i) it involves three major carriers in the U.S. domestic airline
industry; (ii) the alliance was the largest ever approved in the history of the U.S. commercial
aviation; and (iii) the alliance turned out to be the most contentious alliance in the U.S.
domestic airline industry.
In this paper, we specifically assess how Delta Air Lines (DL), Northwest Airlines (NW)
and Continental Airlines’ (CO) on-time performance change in response to their codeshare
agreement of August 23, 2003. We find that the codeshare agreement (CSA) improved OTP
for the alliance firms, and that this improvement occurs in both markets where the codeshare
partners had competed prior to the CSA and markets where they did not. However, the
OTP effects are larger in markets they competed prior to the CSA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of
the Delta, Northwest, Continental codeshare alliance. Section 2.3 describes the data used
for analysis. Section 2.4 discusses the research methodology and estimation technique used
to analyze the OTP effects of the alliance. Results are presented and discussed in Section
2.5, while concluding remarks are gathered in Section 2.6.
2.2 Delta/Northwest/Continental Codeshare Alliance
In August 2002, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines and Continental Airlines submitted the
largest domestic codeshare agreement proposal in the United States. This agreement grants
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some privileges to the partner airlines like reciprocal frequent-flyer programs and reciprocal
access to airport lounges. The partner airlines’ managers claimed that the CSA will generate
benefits to consumers such as increased flight frequencies, broader travel options, improved
frequent flyer programs and better route connections. They also claimed that cost savings
from the alliance members will be passed on to consumers in terms of lower airfares.
Despite initial assurances by the partner airlines, policy makers have expressed a great
deal of skepticism when appraising the Delta/Northwest/Continental alliance proposal,
which policy makers believed did not adhere to certain antitrust laws and regulations be-
cause of its potential to yield anti-competitive effects:
“The Department has determined that the agreements, if implemented
as presented by the three airlines, could result in a significant adverse im-
pact on airline competition, unless the airlines formally accept and abide
by certain conditions that are intended to limit the likelihood of competitive
harm. If the airlines choose to implement the agreements without accept-
ing those conditions, the department will direct its Aviation Enforcement
office to institute a formal enforcement proceeding regarding the matter”7
Likewise, the General Accounting Office (GAO) stressed the adverse effects of alliances on
competition:
“[Proposed alliances] will reduce competition on hundreds of domestic
routes if the alliance partners do not compete with each other or compete
less vigorously than they did when they were unaffiliated... It will be crit-
ical to determine if an airline retains or reduces incentives for alliance
partners to compete on price”8
7Department of Transportation. Office of the Secretary Termination Review Under 49 U.S.C. 41720 of
the Delta/Northwest/Continental Agreements. Federal Register. Vol 68, No.15. Thursday, January 23,
2003. Notices
8US General Accounting Office. Aviation Competition: Proposed Domestic Airline Alliances Raise
Serious Issues. 1998
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The three-way alliance between Delta, Northwest and Continental was the largest do-
mestic alliance at the time, accounting for almost 30% of domestic origin-destination pas-
sengers (Ito and Lee, 2005). Given this recent trend towards increased alliance formation
and the fact that at the time, carriers comprising the three largest US alliances (Conti-
nental/Northwest/Delta, United/US Airways and American/Alaska) accounted for approx-
imately two thirds of all domestic origin and destination passenger traffic, we posit that
there could be legitimate policy apprehensions regarding the impact of these cooperative
agreements on on-time performance delivery.
Using data on OTP and factors that are likely to influence OTP, this paper uses a
reduced-form regression analysis to investigate whether partner airlines’ OTP is impacted
by them being in a CSA. While arguments can be made to support both views, there is
currently no empirical evidence that supports either.
2.3 Data
We use data gathered and published by U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS). The BTS requires all U.S. domestic carriers with revenues
from domestic passenger flights of at least one percent of total industry revenues to report
flight on-time performance data. The data cover scheduled-service flights between points
within the United States.
The data frequency is monthly. A record in this survey represents a flight. Each record
or fight9 contains information on the operating carrier, the origin and destination airports,
miles flown, flight times, and departure/arrival delay information.
In this paper, a market simply means directional air travel between an origin and a
destination city during a specific period. By directional, we mean that an air travel trip
9Some flights could be segments of itineraries with intermediate stop(s).
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from Miami to Las Vegas is a distinct market from an air travel trip from Las Vegas to Miami.
This controls for the number of passengers traveling between the origin and destination.10
Moreover, because on-time performance is only measured for individual flights, we re-
stricted our analysis to nonstop service. We collect monthly data for every non-stop domestic
flight for the third and fourth quarters of 2002 and 2004 for 19 U.S. carriers. Table 2.1 re-
ports a list of carriers in the data sample. All variables are constructed from the original
data set of 6,274,848 flights in the sample. We omitted all canceled and diverted flights.
Table 2.1: Airlines in Sample
Code Airline
AA American Airlines
AS Alaska Airlines
B6 JetBlue Airways
CO Continental Air Lines
DH Independence Air
DL Delta Air Lines
EV Atlantic Southwest
FL AirTran Airways
HA Hawaiian Airlines
HP America West Airlines
MQ American Eagle
NW Northwest Airlines
CO Comair
OO SkyWest
RU ExpressJet
TZ ATA Airlines
UA United Air Lines
US US Airways
WN Southwest Airlines
Given that the Delta/Northwest/Continental codeshare alliance was formed in August
of 2003, the third and fourth quarters of 2002 represent the pre-alliance period whereas the
third and fourth quarters of 2004 represent the post-alliance period (using data from the
10See Berry et al. (2006), Berry et al. (2006) and Gayle (2007). However, unlike these studies, some flights
could be segments of itineraries with intermediate stop(s).
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same quarters for both years will control for potential seasonal effects in OTP). We choose
this particular time period to balance the “before” and “after” periods around the codeshare
event and avoid data right after the September 11th terrorist attacks.
To enable a more manageable-sized data set, we place some restrictions on the raw data.
We follow the same procedures used by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) for the selection of
markets. We focus on air travel amongst the 63 largest U.S. cities. Table 2.2 presents a list
of the cities and corresponding population sizes. Incomplete data reporting in addition to
missing/incorrect on-time performance data slightly reduces the sample.
We use the geometric mean of the populations at the origin and destination to help
measure the impact of potential market size. Unlike Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we do
not group cities that belong to the same metropolitan areas and share the same airport
for two reasons: (1) airport grouping will lessen the heterogeneity in OTP data and (2)
observations in dataset may not be products but are individual flights, most of which are
segments on itineraries with intermediate stop(s).
2.3.1 On-Time Performance (OTP) Measures
We directly use measures of on-time performance from the U.S. DOT BTS’ dataset. Ac-
cording to the U.S. DOT, flights that don’t arrive at (depart from) the gate within 15
minutes of scheduled arrival (departure) time are late arrivals (departures). This represents
performance measured against airlines’ published schedules. The three main measures are
arrival delay, the percentage of flights arriving at least 15 minutes late and the percentage
of flights arriving at least 30 minutes late. We construct the first OTP measure based on
the arrival delay of a flight, i.e. the difference between scheduled and actual arrival time.
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Table 2.2: Cities, airports and population
City, State Airports City Population
2002 2004
New York1 LGA, JFK, EWR 8,606,988 8,682,908
Los, Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,786,010 3,796,018
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,886,634 2,848,996
Dallas, TX2 DAL, DFW 2,362,046 2,439,703
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,002,144 2,058,645
Phoenix, AZ3 PHX 1,951,642 2,032,803
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,486,712 1,514,658
San Antonio, TX SAT 1,192,591 1,239,011
San Diego, CA SAN 1,251,808 1,274,878
San Jose, CA SJC 896,076 901,283
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 841,722 848,227
Detroit, MI DTW 922,727 924,016
San Francisco, CA SFO 761,983 773,284
Jacksonville, FL JAX 758,513 778,078
Indianapolis, IN IND 783,028 787,198
Austin, TX AUS 671,486 696,384
Columbus, OH CMH 723,246 735,971
Charlotte, NC CLT 577,191 614,446
Memphis, TN MEM 674,478 681,573
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN MSP 660,771 653,872
Boston, MA BOS 585,366 607,367
Baltimore, MD BWI 636,141 641,004
Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 503,524 534,599
El Paso, TX ELP 574,337 582,952
Seattle, WA SEA 570,166 570,961
Nashville, TN BNA 544,375 570,068
Milwaukee, WI MKE 589,975 601,081
Washington, DC DCA, IAD 564,643 579,796
Las Vegas, NV LAS 506,695 534,168
Louisville, KY SDF 553,049 558,389
Portland, OR PDX 537,752 533,120
Oklahoma City, OK OKC 518,516 526,939
Tucson, AZ TUS 501,332 517,246
Atlanta, GA ATL 419,476 468,839
Albuquerque, NM ABQ 464,178 486,319
Kansas City, MO MCI 443,390 458,618
Sacramento, CA SMF 433,801 446,295
Long Beach, CA LGB 470,398 470,620
Omaha, NE OMA 399,081 426,549
Miami, FL MIA 371,953 378,946
Cleveland, OH CLE 468,126 455,798
Oakland, CA OAK 401,348 394,433
Colorado Springs, CO COS 369,945 388,097
Tulsa, OK TUL 390,991 382,709
Wichita, KS ICT 354,306 353,292
St. Louis, MO STL 347,252 350,705
New Orleans, LA MSY 472,540 461,915
Tampa, FL TPA 315,151 320,713
Santa Ana, CA SNA 341,411 339,319
Cincinnati, OH CVG 322,278 331,717
Pittsburg, PA PIT 327,652 320,394
Lexington, KY LEX 262,706 274,581
Buffalo, NY BUF 287,469 281,757
Norfolk, VA ORF 238,343 241,979
Ontario, CA ONT 164,734 168,068
1 New York-Newark-Jersey
2 Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth-Plano, TX
3 Phoenix-Temple-Mesa, AZ
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Following Prince and Simon (2009), our analysis is conducted at the carrier-route-month-
year level, so we use the average arrival delay11 over all of a carrier’s flights, on a particular
route, during a month and year.
The second OTP measure is constructed from the arrival delay indicator in the dataset
for flights arriving at the gate at least 15 minutes late. We use this arrival delay indicator
to compute the proportion of a carrier’s flights on a route in a month that arrived at least
15 minutes late.
The third OTP measure uses the 30 minutes and more arrival delay indicator. Similar
to the second measure, we use this arrival delay indicator to compute the proportion of a
carrier’s flights on a route in a month that arrived at least 30 minutes late. We use analogous
measures for departure OTP. The same 15- and 30-minute rules apply to departure delay.
Table 2.3 summarizes OTP measures. Overall, arrival delays are longer than departure
delays for all measures, supporting the findings from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(2011) that indicate that on-time arrival performance has the greatest impact on passengers.
Also, arrival measures tend to vary more than departure measures.
Table 2.3: On-Time Performance Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Arrival
Arrival Delay (in minutes) 31748 10.71 8.94 0 440
Fraction of flights arriving at least 15 minutes late (%) 31748 12.13 9.47 0 100
Fraction of flights arriving at least 30 minutes late (%) 31748 6.59 6.10 0 100
Departure
Departure Delay (in minutes) 31748 9.20 8.90 0 415
Fraction of flights departing at least 15 minutes late (%) 31748 10.22 8.94 0 100
Fraction of flights departing at least 30 minutes late (%) 31748 5.85 5.75 0 100
Note: Early arrivals/departures are counted as zero delays
Figure A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix display the frequency of observations in 15-minute
intervals around their scheduled arrival (departure) time. It is surprising to note that a
11Early arrivals are counted as zero delays.
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sizeable portion of the flights in our sample were “early”—55.4 percent of flights arrived
at their gate prior to the scheduled arrival time while 47.6 percent of flights departed from
their gate prior to the scheduled departure time. This is indicative of a certain amount of
slack that may be built into the airlines’ schedules. Prince and Simon (2009) suggests that
this may be done strategically by airlines. On the other hand, 17.6 percent of flights in
the dataset arrived 15 minutes or more late while 14.7 percent departed from their gate 15
minutes or more late.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 summarize OTP by month. For all measures, the percentage of flights
arriving late peaks in winter. We only consider flights arriving at their destination and do
not include cancellations or diversions even though cancellations tend to rise during the
winter months in the face of severe weather (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2011).
Throughout our study, early arrivals are treated as a delay of zero minutes rather
than as a negative delay. Counting early arrivals and departures as zero delays assumes
that passengers derive disutility from late arrivals/departures but no utility from early ar-
rivals/departures.
Tables 2.6 & 2.7 summarize OTP by carrier. Hawaiian Airlines performs better than
all carriers on arrival delay minutes, while Independence Air has the worst arrival delay
minutes. Northwest Airlines has the shortest departure delay minutes while SkyWest has
the longest departure delay minutes.
2.3.2 Collapsing the Data
Given that in a specific month, an airline can operate a specific origin-destination multiple
times, with different OTP values, we construct our OTP measures by averaging the OTP
values for a given origin-destination for a given carrier in a given month and year. We
then collapse the data by carrier-origin-destination-month-year combinations. Explanatory
variables are averaged and collapsed using the same approach. Our final working data
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set has 31,748 usable observations, where an observation is at the level of carrier-origin-
destination-month-year combination.
Table 2.4: Mean Values of Arrival Delay Measures by Month
year Month
Mean Arrival
Delay (minutes)
Percentage of flights
delayed more than 15 minutes
Percentage of flights
delayed more than 30 minutes
2002 July 10.9 13.9 7.8
August 9 11.9 6.3
September 6.1 8 4.2
October 7.5 11 5.2
November 7.4 10.6 4.9
December 11.8 14.8 8.1
2004 July 15.2 14.1 8.4
August 13.3 13.9 7.6
September 7.9 7.9 4.2
October 9.4 11 5.4
November 11.6 12.2 6.5
December 15.8 16.8 9.9
Note: Early arrivals are counted as zero delays
Table 2.5: Mean Values of Departure Delay Measures by Month
Year Month
Mean Departure
Delay (minutes)
Percentage of flights
delayed more than 15 minutes
Percentage of flights
delayed more than 30 minutes
2002 July 9.6 12.3 6.9
August 7.9 10.3 5.7
September 5.1 6.5 3.7
October 5.9 8.2 4.3
November 5.9 7.7 4.1
December 10.2 12.8 7.2
2004 July 13.2 12.3 7.5
August 11.3 11.1 6.6
September 6.9 7 4
October 7.7 8.7 4.7
November 9.9 10.1 5.8
December 14.2 14.8 9
Note: Early departures are counted as zero delays
2.4 Empirical Method and Estimation
To examine whether partner firms’ on-time performance is impacted by their participation in
a codeshare alliance, we estimate reduced-form regression equations of the various measures
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Table 2.6: Airlines’ Mean Arrival Delay
Code Airline
Arrival Delay
(minutes)
Proportion of Flights
Arrivingat Least
15 Minutes Late (%)
Proportion of Flights
Arriving at Least
30 Minutes Late (%)
HA Hawaiian Airlines 0.0 0.00 0.00
WN Southwest Airlines 8.9 13.92 7.41
UA United Air Lines 9.4 8.83 5.00
NW Northwest Airlines 9.5 14.88 7.15
US US Airways 9.8 13.62 7.45
B6 JetBlue Airways 10.0 12.17 6.61
AA American Airlines 10.7 10.46 6.27
DL Delta Air Lines 10.7 13.19 6.60
CO Continental Air Lines 11.1 12.85 6.76
TZ ATA Airlines 11.1 12.84 7.08
AS Alaska Airlines 11.2 12.33 6.65
HP America West Airlines 11.2 9.64 4.63
RU ExpressJet 12.9 13.28 7.70
OH Comair 13.3 12.86 7.68
EV Atlantic Southwest 13.4 5.05 3.15
FL AirTran Airways 14.0 5.73 3.99
MQ American Eagle 14.4 13.38 8.09
OO SkyWest 16.2 7.73 5.23
DH Independence Air 17.5 13.01 8.59
Note: Early arrivals are counted as zero delays
of OTP described above. Possible codeshare alliance effects on OTP are identified using
a difference-in-differences strategy. This strategy enables us to compare pre-post alliance
periods’ changes in OTP of flights operated by the alliance firms, relative to changes in OTP
of flights operated by non-alliance firms over the same pre-post alliance periods.
We specify our empirical model of product quality effects due to code-sharing. On-time
performance (OTP) is used to proxy product quality. We specify a linear regression model
in which an OTP measure is a function of: (1) timing of implementation of the codeshare
alliance; (2) carrier and airport characteristics; and (3) market structure characteristics.
Furthermore, we also examine whether the effect of code-sharing on OTP depends on the
existence of pre-alliance competition between alliance firms. Variables are defined in Table
2.8.
The baseline reduced-form specification of the arrival OTP of flight f in market m in
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Table 2.7: Airlines’ Mean Departure Delay
Code Airline
Departure Delay
(minutes)
Proportion of Flights
Departing at Least
15 Minutes Late (%)
Proportion of Flights
Departing at Least
30 Minutes Late (%)
NW Northwest Airlines 7.0 9.75 5.55
CO Continental Air Lines 7.6 7.69 4.58
TZ ATA Airlines 7.8 9.01 5.09
UA United Air Lines 7.8 7.03 4.35
DL Delta Air Lines 8.3 9.25 5.13
US US Airways 8.5 11.37 6.42
AA American Airlines 8.8 8.39 5.4
HA Hawaiian Airlines 8.8 12.53 12.5
RU ExpressJet 8.9 8.47 5.63
B6 JetBlue Airways 9.3 11.36 5.33
HP America West Airlines 9.5 6.97 3.89
WN Southwest Airlines 9.7 16.57 8.33
AS Alaska Airlines 10.8 11.81 6.69
MQ American Eagle 11.9 11.23 7.06
FL AirTran Airways 12.2 5.61 3.62
OH Comair 12.3 12.18 7.5
EV Atlantic Southwest 13.2 5.4 3.38
DH Independence Air 16.6 12.63 8.3
OO SkyWest 17.0 7.66 5.13
Note: Early departures are counted as zero delays
time period t is as follows:
OTPfmt = α + βXfmt + γZmt + δWfmt + λf + ηt + originm + destm + εfmt. (2.1)
where Xfmt represent flight characteristics, Zmt include market characteristics, Wfmt is
a vector of dummy variables representing the codeshare effects. λf ’s are airline specific
fixed effects, ηt’s are time specific fixed effects, origin and destination airport specific fixed
effects are denoted by originm and destm, εfmt is the unobserved part of OTP. The reduced-
form OTP regression is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We provide further
description of the explanatory variables in the following section.
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Table 2.8: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Codeshare Event
T dnct
Time period dummy variable, equals unity
for post-alliance period.
0.566 0.496
Flight, airport and market characteristics
DPRESCOST
Number of different cities that an airline flies to from
the destination city of the market using nonstop flight
30.171 30.84
OPRESCOST
Number of different cities that an airline offers
flights from going into the origin city of the market
30.095 30.792
INTOHUB
Dummy Variable = 1 if destination is a hub for
that carrier (list of hub/airline combination in Table 2.9)
0.387 0.487
OUTOFHUB
Dummy Variable = 1 if origin is a hub for that
carrier (list of hub/airline combination in Table 2.9)
0.387 0.487
DISTANCE
Nonstop flying distance (in miles) between the origin
and destination.
937.118 635.545
RELSPEED
Carrier mean speed across its flights in a market
as a ratio of market average speed(a)
1 0.016
MKT dnc
Market-specific dummy variable, equals unity
for O&D(b) markets in which any two of three allied
carriers competed prior to alliance.
0.022 0.146
MKTSIZE
(logged) Geometric mean of the populations
at both endpoint airports
13.483 0.536
DNCfmt
Zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one
when the carrier is one of the three alliance carriers,
DL, NW, or CO.
0.264 0.441
Market Structure
MONOMKT
Dummy Variable = 1 if only 1 airline serves
the directional city-pair market non-stop
0.43 0.495
NUMCOMP Number of competitors in a market 1.817 0.877
(a)Speed is measured as distance divided by flight air time
(b)O&D = origin and destination.
54
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Estimates from Reduced-form Arrival OTP Equation
In this section, we present empirical analyses of the impact of code-sharing on OTP. We
start with on-time arrival performance since it has greatest impact on passengers (Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, 2011).
Determinants of Arrival OTP
Airport congestion has an influential role in determining on-time performance.12 One way
to control for airport congestion is controlling for hubbing. Effective hubbing implies that
flights from different origin airports known as “spokes” of a network arrive at the “hub”
airport roughly at the same time. The aircraft at the hub waits for these spoke flights and
facilitates the transfer of passengers and baggage. Subsequently, flights depart from the hub
airport in quick sequence back out along the spokes.
Essentially, passengers departing from any non-hub origin to other destinations in the
network generally proceed first to the hub. Table 2.9 shows that 14 out of the 19 carriers
possess at least one hub and 11 have at least 3 hubs. These airlines co-ordinate arrivals and
departures at their hubs in order to minimize delays for passengers continuing through the
hub to final destinations on spokes other than the one on which they originated. We include
a control for hub airlines (INTOHUB). This measure is carrier-specific and captures the
effect of effective hubbing on arrival OTP. INTOHUB is a dummy variable that equals
unity if destination airport is a hub for that carrier. As expected, regression results in
Table 2.10 reveal that INTOHUB is a predictor of arrival OTP. The coefficient estimate
on INTOHUB is negative and statistically significant suggesting shorter arrival delays for
carriers flying into their hubs. Carriers flying into their hubs have a greater incentive to
12Flores-Fillol (2010) and Rupp and Sayanak (2008), among others, investigate this relationship.
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make sure that passengers get to their intermediate stop on time for their connecting flights
since the cost of a missing flight may be quite substantial from rebooking passengers onto
new connections to handling missed connection luggage. The disutility13 experienced by the
passenger in terms of inconvenience and frustration may result in loss of future business.
Table 2.9: Airline Carriers and Their Hubs
Code Carrier Hub Airports
AA American Airlines Dallas, O’Hare, Miami, New York, Los Angeles
AS Alaska Airlines Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles, San Francisco
B6 JetBlue Airways New York
CO Continental Air Lines Houston, Cleveland, Newark
DL Delta Air Lines
Atlanta, Cincinnati, New York, Boston, Los Angeles,
Minneapolis, Detroit, Seattle
EV Atlantic Southwest
Dallas, O’Hare, Atlanta, Detroit, Cleveland, Houston,
Denver, Kansas City, Newark, Dulles
HP America West Airlines Los Angeles, Phoenix
MQ American Eagle Dallas, O’Hare, Miami, New York
NW Northwest Airlines Minneapolis. Detroit, Memphis
OO SkyWest
O’Hare, Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Detroit, Minneapolis, Denver, Houston, San Francisco, Phoenix
TZ ATA Airlines O’Hare, Indianapolis
UA United Air Lines
Houston, O’Hare, San Francisco, Houston,
Denver, Los Angeles, Newark
US US Airways Cleveland, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Washington
WN Southwest Airlines
Atlanta, Washington, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles,
Las Vegas, Houston, Phoenix, Oakland
Mazzeo (2003) finds interestingly that flights out of the hub have a longer than scheduled
flight time on average, whereas flights into the hub do not. He partly attributes these
differences to the logistical difficulties associated with turning around large banks of flights
at busy hub airports. We were able to obtain similar results from an estimation not shown
in this paper.
Since carriers often have hubs of different sizes, a particular airport might be a ma-
jor hub for the airline while another airport might be a medium-size hub. However, the
13It is difficult to make a reliable welfare statement about the relationship between OTP and congestion
in the absence of data on demand.
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INTOHUB variable does not capture the heterogeneity in hub sizes for a given carrier
since it is a dummy variable. Thus, to capture this heterogeneity in carrier’s hub sizes,
we also include a continuous variable DPRESCOST which counts the number of different
cities that an airline serves using nonstop flight from the destination city of the market. In-
cluding DPRESCOST controls for (dis)economies of scope and hubbing effects associated
with offering multiple routes from the same destination airport. The coefficient estimate
on DPRESCOST is negative and statistically significant as expected. A carrier’s arrival
delay decreases with the size of its hub to which it transports passengers. The incentive for
(hub) carriers to improve arrival OTP on flights into their hubs is stronger for larger hubs.
Table 2.10: Arrival On-Time Performance Estimation Results
Variables
Arrival Delay
in Minutes
(1)
Arrival Delay
in Minutes
(2)
% of Flights
Arriving
at Least 15
Minutes Late
(3)
% of Flights
Arriving
at Least 15
Minutes Late
(4)
% of Flights
Arriving
at Least 30
Minutes Late
(5)
% of Flights
Arriving
at Least 30
Minutes Late
(6)
INTOHUB -1.3499*** -1.3478*** -1.1886*** -1.1787*** -0.7450*** -0.7502***
(0.2065) (0.2066) (0.1585) (0.1586) (0.1079) (0.1079)
DPRESCOST -0.0208*** -0.0208*** 0.0083*** 0.0079*** 0.0018 0.002
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0019)
MKTSIZE 20.6967*** 21.0915*** 17.8731*** 18.0976*** 12.2403*** 12.4839***
(5.4601) (5.4639) (4.1912) (4.1936) (2.8517) (2.8538)
DISTANCE -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
RELSPEED -37.0368*** -37.3472*** 4.3097 4.0099 3.8671** 3.7672**
(3.4189) (3.4205) (2.6244) (2.6253) (1.7857) (1.7866)
MONOMKT 0.6765*** 0.6999*** 6.1969*** 6.2091*** 3.2302*** 3.2455***
(0.1934) (0.1938) (0.1484) (0.1488) (0.1010) (0.1012)
NUMCOMP -0.0609 -0.0373 -3.0513*** -3.0253*** -1.7877*** -1.7826***
(0.1188) (0.1191) (0.0912) (0.0914) (0.0620) (0.0622)
DNCfmt 1.4607*** 1.3976*** 0.6141*** 0.5186** -0.4826*** -0.4771***
(0.2733) (0.2755) (0.2098) (0.2115) (0.1427) (0.1439)
T dnct 4.2784*** 4.2674*** 2.9316*** 2.9217*** 2.0867*** 2.0827***
(0.1695) (0.1696) (0.1301) (0.1301) (0.0885) (0.0886)
T dnct ×DNCfmt -1.4460*** -1.3132*** -0.4744** -0.3517* -0.6666*** -0.6198***
(0.2507) (0.2555) (0.1925) (0.1961) (0.1310) (0.1335)
MKT dnc 0.5691 0.0625 0.5453**
(0.5150) (0.3953) (0.2690)
T dnct ×DNCfmt ×MKT dnc -2.1015*** -2.0021*** -0.6964*
(0.7669) (0.5886) (0.4005)
Constant -226.7955*** -231.6940*** -224.3223*** -227.0041*** -155.5177*** -158.6174***
(71.4461) (71.4932) (54.8431) (54.8718) (37.3152) (37.3417)
No. of Obs. 31748 31748 31748 31748 31748 31748
R2 0.23 0.23 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.35
The equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. Fixed effects are included in each specification but were not reported for brevity.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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Columns 3 through 6 of Table 2.10 re-estimate the model using different measures of
OTP—the percentage of flights arriving at least 15 minutes late and the percentage of
flights arriving at least 30 minutes late. These other measures look at delay over a certain
threshold.
The coefficient estimate on DPRESCOST is positive and statistically significant when
the dependent variable is the percentage of flights arriving at least 15 minutes late. The
coefficient estimate on DPRESCOST in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.10 indicates that for
flights over a certain delay threshold (15 minutes and more), an airline’s OTP worsens with
increases in the number of distinct cities that an airline has nonstop flights to, going out
of the destination airport. In other words, for flights into destination airport that are at
least 15 minute late, carriers’ arrival OTP worsens, the larger the scale of operations at
the destination airport. This result is potentially driven by logistical difficulties associated
with turning around large banks of flights. The same reasoning applies when we use the
percentage of flights arriving at least 30 minutes late as the dependent variable, however
the estimates on DPRESCOST in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.10 are not statistically
significant.
In addition, we also control for market size (MKTSIZE), measured as the (logged)
geometric mean of the populations at both market endpoints. The net impact of market
size on OTP may either be negative or positive. On one hand, larger market sizes may
be associated with higher demand for air travel and thus more airport congestion resulting
in more delays. On the other hand, in larger markets airlines have more incentive to be
on time because more people will be affected if they are not, resulting in future loss of
business. Thus, in the latter case, arrival OTP may improve with increasing market size.
Therefore, we argue that MKTSIZE captures the net effect of these conflicting forces. The
coefficient estimate on MKTSIZE is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that
larger markets are associated with worse arrival on-time performance. Thus, the airport
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congestion effect dominates.
On-time performance is also influenced by flight distance and the relative speed of the
flight. The variable DISTANCE represents the flight’s distance in miles. The parameter
estimate on DISTANCE is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that carriers
have some ability to “make time up in the air” on longer flights. This ability to “make time
up in the air” improves arrival OTP.
We also include a measure for the carrier’s relative speed (RELSPEED) defined as
the average speed of a carrier’s flights in the market divided by the average speed of all
flights in the market. RELSPEED captures how fast a carrier is, relative to the typical
carrier’s velocity in a market. The parameter estimate on RELSPEED is negative and
statistically significant, suggesting that airline carriers with above-average flying speed tend
to have better arrival OTP.
Building on extant research exploring the relationship between service quality and com-
petitive conditions, we investigate how route competition affects carriers’ arrival OTP.14 We
control for route-level competition by including a measure of market structure (MONOMKT ),
which is a monopoly dummy variable that equals one if there is only one carrier serving a
given market. The coefficient estimate on MONOMKT is positive and statistically sig-
nificant. This result is consistent with our expectations, suggesting that arrival delays are
greater on less competitive routes. This result is also consistent with findings by Mazzeo
(2003) and Rupp et al. (2006) who posit that airlines provide worse on-time performance
on less competitive routes.
To go a step further, consider how the degree of market competitiveness, as measured
by the number of competitors (NUMCOMP ) in a given market, affects the arrival OTP.
NUMCOMP represents a more heterogeneous measure of market structure compared to
the MONOMKT dummy variable. As expected, arrival OTP improves with increasing
14Studies by Mazzeo (2003) and Rupp et al. (2006) examine this relationship.
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number of competitors. Though the coefficient estimate on NUMCOMP has the expected
sign, it is not statistically significant in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.10.
Codeshare Effects on Arrival On-Time Performance
The remaining rows of Table 2.10 contain the key variables of interest in evaluating the
codeshare effects of a codeshare agreement on arrival OTP. We also focus on changes in
arrival OTP in certain types of markets—markets where any two of the three alliance firms
had competed prior to the alliance.
To examine persistent differences in OTP of flights operated by the alliance partners,
we include a dummy variable DNCfmt which equals unity for flights operated by any of the
alliance carriers. The coefficient estimate on DNCfmt is positive and statistically significant
in columns 1–4 in Table 2.10, indicating that throughout the sample period the mean arrival
delay of flights operated by Delta, Northwest and Continental is greater than the mean
arrival delay of flights operated by other carriers in the sample.
We also define a dummy variable T dnct to help identify the OTP effects of the codeshare
alliance. T dnct is a time period dummy variable, which equals unity in the post-alliance
period. The positive coefficient estimate on T dnct measures, on average, how arrival delay
changes over the pre-post codeshare alliance period for flights that are not associated with
Delta, Northwest or Continental Airlines. The positive coefficient estimate on T dnct indicates
that the mean arrival delay of flights operated by airlines other than Delta, Northwest and
Continental airlines increased (OTP worsens) from pre- to post-alliance periods.
Finally, we include the interaction between the DNCfmt and T
dnc
t variables. The coeffi-
cient estimate on this new variable T dnct ×DNCfmt represents the difference-in-differences
estimate that identifies whether arrival delay of flights operated by any of the alliance carri-
ers changed differently relative to arrival delay of flights operated by other airlines over the
pre- and post-alliance periods. It captures changes in arrival delay in DL/NW/CO flights
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(relative to non-DL/NW/CO flights) due to the alliance. The estimate is negative, suggest-
ing that the alliance caused the mean arrival delay for DL/NW/CO flights to fall compared
to the mean arrival delay for non-DL/NW/CO flights over the pre– and post–alliance peri-
ods. In a nutshell, the codeshare alliance is associated with improved arrival OTP for the
alliance firms relative to other carriers.
This result is supported by Table A.1 in the Appendix. Table A.1 reports mean arrival
(departure) delay minutes before and after the alliance for alliance partners versus other
carriers. Table A.1 indicates that even though OTP worsens overall over the pre-post
alliance periods for all carriers on average, the increase in delay minutes is smaller for the
alliance partners’ flights. We test for the difference in mean arrival (departure) delay minutes
between alliance partners and other carriers. All tests of difference in means are statistically
significant at 1% level.
Codeshare Effects on Arrival OTP based on Existence of Pre-alliance Competi-
tion between Alliance Firms
To examine whether changes in partner carriers’ arrival OTP are explained by the existence
of pre-alliance competition between alliance firms, we construct and include a market-specific
dummy variable, MKT dnc that equals to one for origin-destination markets in which any two
of the three alliance partners competed prior to the alliance. Thus, we are able to examine
whether the codeshare effects on OTP differ in markets where the alliance partners competed
prior to the alliance. Columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2.10 reproduce the baseline arrival OTP
regressions with the inclusion of the market dummy variable and some interactions with
this dummy variable.
The effects of the DL/NW/CO codeshare alliance on OTP in markets where the alliance
firms competed before the alliance is determined by summing the coefficients on the in-
teraction variables T dnct ×DNCfmt and T dnct ×DNCfmt ×MKT dnc in Specification 2 and
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doing the same for Specifications 4 and 6 (columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2.10). Summing the
coefficients yields a negative estimate, indicating an improvement in arrival OTP of flights
operated by the alliance firms in the markets where they competed with each other prior to
their alliance.
The coefficient estimate on the interaction variable T dnct ×DNCfmt in columns 2, 4 and
6 of Table 2.10, has a different interpretation. In fact, the coefficient estimate captures
changes in arrival delay in DL/NW/CO flights due to the codeshare alliance in markets
they did not compete prior to the alliance. The coefficient estimate on T dnct ×DNCfmt in
columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 2.10, is negative and statistically significant at conventional
levels of significance, suggesting that the codeshare alliance also improved arrival on-time
performance in markets where the alliance firms did not compete prior to alliance. Thus,
evidence shows that the alliance caused the alliance firms to improve arrival OTP regardless
of whether they competed or not in markets prior to the alliance, but the partners’ arrival
OTP improvements are relatively larger in markets that the partners competed in prior to
the alliance.
2.5.2 Estimates from Reduced-form Departure OTP Equation
To further isolate the source of delays, we investigate the effect of code-sharing on departure
delay. Similar to arrival OTP, we consider three different measures of departure OTP. In
Table 2.11, we report results for the three measures of departure delay in the data. We also
control for flight and market structure characteristics as well as airline, month, year and
airport-specific fixed effects.
Determinants of Departure OTP
We now analyze factors that influence airlines’ departure OTP, with the ultimate goal of
understanding how this OTP measure is influenced by a codeshare alliance. To control for
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Table 2.11: Departure On-Time Performance Estimation Results
Variables
Departure Delay
in Minutes
(1)
Departure Delay
in Minutes
(2)
% of Flights
Departing
at Least 15
Minutes Late
(3)
% of Flights
Departing
at Least 15
Minutes Late
(4)
% of Flights
Departing
at Least 30
Minutes Late
(5)
% of Flights
Departing
at Least 30
Minutes Late
(6)
OUTOFHUB 0.8131*** 0.8090*** 1.2659*** 1.2491*** 0.8167*** 0.8035***
(0.1803) (0.1803) (0.1441) (0.1442) (0.1011) (0.1011)
OPRESCOST 0.0238*** 0.0240*** 0.0287*** 0.0294*** 0.0127*** 0.0132***
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0018)
DISTANCE -2.98e-5 -2.83e-5 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
MKTSIZE 18.5741*** 18.7712*** 25.8526*** 26.4670*** 13.7093*** 14.1043***
(4.7830) (4.7869) (3.8244) (3.8262) (2.6817) (2.6829)
MONOMKT 0.4188** 0.4313** 4.9897*** 5.0294*** 2.8408*** 2.8667***
(0.1694) (0.1698) (0.1355) (0.1358) (0.0950) (0.0952)
NUMCOMP 0.0438 0.0455 -2.4309*** -2.4319*** -1.4493*** -1.4535***
(0.1041) (0.1043) (0.0832) (0.0834) (0.0583) (0.0585)
DNCfmt -0.6325*** -0.6173** -1.0298*** -0.9519*** -1.0913*** -1.0239***
(0.2394) (0.2413) (0.1914) (0.1929) (0.1342) (0.1353)
T dnct 2.9635*** 2.9608*** 2.6752*** 2.6689*** 1.9002*** 1.8973***
(0.1485) (0.1485) (0.1187) (0.1187) (0.0832) (0.0832)
T dnct ×DNCfmt -1.3356*** -1.3065*** -0.7249*** -0.6581*** -0.6411*** -0.6118***
(0.2197) (0.2239) (0.1756) (0.1789) (0.1232) (0.1255)
MKT dnc 0.486 1.6518*** 1.1398***
(0.4509) (0.3604) (0.2527)
T dnct ×DNCfmt ×MKT dnc -0.4129 -0.8777 -0.3321
(0.6715) (0.5367) (0.3764)
Constant -237.3860*** -239.9722*** -325.2973*** -333.3471*** -171.8417*** -177.0110***
(62.4722) (62.5240) (49.9509) (49.9755) (35.0266) (35.0426)
No. of Obs. 31748 31748 31748 31748 31748 31748
R2 0.24 0.24 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.35
The equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. Fixed effects are included in each specification but were not reported for brevity.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
airport congestion, we include the OUTOFHUB dummy variable that equals one if the ori-
gin airport is a hub for that carrier.15 Similarly to INTOHUB in Table 2.10, OUTOFHUB
captures the hubbing effect on departure OTP. For all three measures of departure OTP, the
hubbing effect is positive and statistically significant, indicating that airlines produce poor
departure OTP on flights originating from their hubs. Flights originating from an airline’s
hub are often spoke flights that are heading to passengers’ final destination (spoke airport).
At spoke airports, there are no interdependencies between airlines’ aircrafts since few arrive
or depart and passengers do not connect, hub carriers may have less incentive to improve
15See list of hub/airline combination in Table 2.9
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OTP (Mayer and Sinai, 2003).
Given its binary nature, OUTOFHUB fails to capture heterogeneity in airline’s hub
sizes. To solve this problem, we include a more reasonable measure of hubbing effects
(OPRESCOST ) in the departure delay regressions. OPRESCOST counts the number of
different cities that an airline offers flights from, going into the origin city of the market
using a nonstop flight. The coefficient estimate on OPRESCOST is positive and statisti-
cally significant for all measures of departure delay as expected. In particular, a carrier’s
departure delay increases with the size of its hub from which it departs.
The negative coefficient on DISTANCE in the departure OTP regression in Table
2.11 suggests that longer flights tend to have shorter departure delays. On longer flights,
carriers have an incentive to depart on time to minimize the likelihood of late arrival (or
late departure for a subsequent connecting flight). Even though carriers departing late can
“make time up” during a flight, there is a downside to that. “Making time up” means
accelerating which end up burning substantially more fuel and adding thousands of dollars
to the overall flight expense. Thus, carriers have an incentive to reduce departure delay so
as to avoid additional costs in “making time up.” Some studies show that pilots do try to
make up time in the air, but only for delays that fall into a particular sweet spot.
Recall that market size is measured as the (logged) geometric mean of the populations
at both market endpoints. The coefficient estimate on MKTSIZE in the departure delay
regression is positive and statistically significant suggesting that larger markets deteriorate
departure OTP. Thus, the airport congestion argument prevails just like in the arrival delay
results.
The market structure variables show similar results to arrival delay regressions. Once
again, the coefficient estimate on the monopoly dummy variable MONOMKT is positive
and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the number of competitors in a given
market NUMCOMP , is negative and statistically significant for two of the departure delay
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measures. These results are consistent with the premise that less competitive markets tend
to have poor departure OTP because of less competitive pressure. Borenstein and Netz
(1999) show that before airlines choose their departure time, they take into consideration
the number of other non-stop competitors on a route.
Codeshare Effects on Departure OTP
The remaining rows of Table 2.11 display key variables of interest that examine the code-
share effects of the Delta/Northwest/Continental codeshare alliance on the partner carriers’
departure OTP. Changes in departure OTP are investigated in markets where any two of
the three alliance firms had competed prior to the alliance.
Similarly to the arrival OTP regressions, we include a dummy variable DNCfmt which
equals unity for flights operated by any of the alliance carriers to examine persistent differ-
ences in departure OTP of flights offered by the alliance partners. The coefficient estimate
on DNCfmt is negative and statistically significant across estimations, indicating that the
mean departure delay of flights operated by Delta, Northwest and Continental airlines is
less than the mean departure delay of flights operated by other carriers in the sample.
The time period dummy T dnct has a positive coefficient estimate suggesting that the mean
departure OTP of flights operated by airlines other than Delta, Northwest and Continental
airlines increased (OTP worsens) from pre- to post-alliance periods.
The coefficient estimate on the interaction variable T dnct ×DNCfmt represents the difference-
in-differences estimate that identifies whether departure OTP of flights operated by any of
the alliance carriers changed differently relative to departure OTP of flights operated by
other airlines over the pre- and post-alliance periods. The coefficient estimate is negative
and statistically significant across estimations, suggesting that the alliance caused the de-
parture OTP for DL/NW/CO flights to increase relative to the mean departure OTP for
non-DL/NW/CO flights over the pre- and post-alliance periods. In a nutshell, the codeshare
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alliance improved departure OTP for the alliance firms relative to other carriers.
Codeshare Effects on Departure OTP based on Existence of Pre-alliance Com-
petition between Alliance Firms
Columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2.11 reproduce the baseline departure OTP regressions with the
inclusion of the MKT dnc dummy variable. The effects of the Delta/Northwest/Continental
codeshare alliance on departure OTP in markets where the alliance firms competed before
the alliance formation is determined by summing the coefficients on the interaction variables
T dnct ×DNCfmt and T dnct ×DNCfmt ×MKT dnc in Specification 2 and doing the same for
Specifications 4 and 6 (columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2.11). Even though the coefficient
estimates on T dnct ×DNCfmt×MKT dnc have the same sign as in the arrival delay regression,
they are not statistically significant.
The coefficient estimate on the interaction variable T dnct ×DNCfmt in columns 2, 4 and
6 of Table 2.11, has a different interpretation. In fact, the coefficient estimate captures
changes in departure OTP in DL/NW/CO flights due to the codeshare alliance in mar-
kets they did not compete prior to the alliance. The coefficient estimate is negative and
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance, suggesting that the codeshare
alliance improved departure OTP in markets where the alliance firms did not compete prior
to alliance.
Thus, evidence shows that the alliance caused the alliance firms to improve departure
OTP regardless of whether they competed or not in different markets prior to the alliance.
2.6 Conclusion
This study builds on the existing literature linking airline alliance and product quality, but
is the first to empirically link airline codeshare alliance to OTP. Airline carriers typically
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coordinate to seamlessly integrate their route networks which potentially result in more
travel-convenient route network connections across partner carriers. While not attempting
to study the incentives to form an alliance, the question that this research intends to shed
light on is whether the route network integration that comes with the alliance provides
sufficient extra incentive to partner carriers to improve their OTP.
We made use of airline OTP data to measure service quality and examine the above
relationship. After controlling for carrier, airport and market structure characteristics, we
find strong evidence that the Delta/Northwest/Continental codeshare alliance improved
both arrival and departure OTP for the alliance firms.
We then explore OTP effects of code-sharing based on the existence of pre-alliance
competition between the alliance firms. We find that the alliance firms improved OTP in
both markets where the partners competed prior to the alliance, and markets where they did
not compete prior. However, the arrival OTP effects of code-sharing are larger in markets
where the partners competed in prior to the alliance.
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Chapter 3
Modelling the Impact of Airline
Product Quality on Airlines’ and
Passengers’ Choice Behavior
3.1 Introduction
Punctuality is certainly a key performance indicator in the airline industry and carriers with
excellent on-time performance record use it as a marketing tool by prominently displaying
it on their websites. Given the increased competition that followed the deregulation of
the airline industry in 1978, many carriers have resorted to product quality differentiation
as a key to long-term profitability. Although airlines generally compete based on pricing,
flight on-time performance is a very important indicator of airline service quality which
drives customer satisfaction and loyalty. For example in the 1990s American Airlines ran
ads calling itself “The On-Time Machine.”1 Likewise, airlines that produce excessive flight
delays receive a great deal of negative publicity.
1Boozer et al. (1990)
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In 1987, the U.S. Congress passed the flight on-time disclosure rule amidst chronic air
traffic delays that stirred public outcry and media coverage. The disclosure rule made it
mandatory for airlines with at least one percent of all domestic traffic to publish flight-by-
flight delay data. Airlines are required to track and report five segments of travel time for
each of their flights to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): i) departure delay, ii)
taxi-out, iii) air time, iv) taxi-in, and v) arrival delay.
Remarkably, even with the flight on-time disclosure rule, the industry’s on-time perfor-
mance is still far below satisfactory levels. A report from the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation’s (DOT) Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings2 revealed that the most
prevailing consumer air travel complaint in the year 2000, stems from flight problems namely
cancellations, delays and missed connections. In fact, 1 out of 4 flights was either delayed,
canceled or diverted (Rupp et al., 2006). According to Mayer and Sinai (2003), in 2000,
flights that arrived at their destination within 15 minutes of their scheduled arrival time and
without being canceled or diverted, accounted for less than 70 percent. Even more recently,
the Bureau of Transportation statistics (BTS) showed that 23.02% of U.S. domestic flights
were delayed3 in 2014, an increase from 14.69% in 2012. The BTS maintains an archive of
monthly and yearly on-time performance data that is also accessible through the Internet.4
Thus, passengers’ most common source of frustration are flight delays.
In the midst of these delay statistics, airlines usually claim that air traffic delays are
out of their control, placing the blame on adverse weather or air traffic control as the most
common culprits.5 A good portion of delay can be attributed to extreme weather, air traffic
control and security checks (U.S. DOT, 2015). In June 2003, the Air Carrier On-Time
2U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings (USDTOAEP)
Feb. 2001 p. 34
3A flight is considered delayed if it arrived at (or departed) the gate 15 minutes or more after the
scheduled arrival (departure) time.
4The BTS archived data are located at http://www.transtats.bts.gov/homedrillchart.asp
5http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/what-to-do-when-airlines-blame-flight-problems-on-
circumstances-beyond-our-control/2015/02/12/7298b264-a57f-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440 story.html
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Reporting Advisory Committee defined five broad categories for the cause of any flight
delay:
1. Air Carrier: The cause of the cancellation or delay was due to circumstances within
the airline’s control (e.g. maintenance or crew problems, aircraft cleaning, baggage
loading, fueling, etc).
2. Extreme Weather: Significant meteorological conditions (actual or forecasted) that, in
the judgment of the carrier, delay or prevent the operation of a flight (e.g. tornado,
blizzard, hurricane, etc.). Weather delays are also included in the National Aviation
System and late-arriving aircraft categories.
3. National Aviation System (NAS): Delays and cancellations attributable to the na-
tional aviation system that refer to a broad set of conditions—non-extreme weather
conditions, airport operations, heavy traffic volume, air traffic control, etc.
4. Late-arriving Aircraft: A previous flight with same aircraft arrived late, causing the
present flight to depart late.
5. Security: Delays or cancellations caused by evacuation of a terminal or concourse,
re-boarding of aircraft because of security breach, inoperative screening equipment
and/or long lines in excess of 29 minutes at screening areas.
Although some of these factors are uncontrollable, airlines still have a substantial level
of control over their on-time performance. An airline can schedule a longer flight time to
absorb potential delays on the taxiways or choose a longer layover on the ground to buffer
against the risk of a late incoming aircraft (Mayer and Sinai, 2003). Figure 3.1 shows the
declining shares of flight delay caused by weather and air traffic control (NAS) while at the
same time the shares of delay caused by late-arriving aircraft and air carrier, continue to
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rise. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that on-time performance improvement potential within
the reach of airlines is feasible.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we examine the monetary value that
consumers place on on-time performance. In order to make our case about consumers valuing
improved OTP, we estimate a discrete choice demand model which allows us to quantify
the opportunity cost of delays to consumers. Thus, incorporating on-time performance into
our demand model affords us the advantage of measuring how much on-time performance
matters to consumers. How much are they willing to pay for better on-time performance or
for each minute of delay?
Figure 3.1: Causes of Delay by Percent Share of Total Delay Minutes
Second, if consumers do value on-time performance, to what extent are airlines willing
to provide improved on-time performance? How does improved on-time performance affect
airlines’ markup in an oligopoly world, a strategic environment where firms are competing
with each other? One way to answer these questions is by examining how airlines product
markups respond to changes in on-time performance. We use the variation in product
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Figure 3.2: Weather’s Share of Total Delay Minutes
markups to measure the incentive a given airline has to improve on-time performance.
The rationale for using markups as a reasonable measure of airlines’ incentive is that
investing in on-time performance is costly but if the improvement can lead to prices suffi-
ciently higher than the increase in costs, which means an increase in markup, then improving
on-time performance might be a worthwhile proposition for airlines. Using markups allows
us to analyze airlines incentive without directly estimating the cost of improving on-time
performance in a sense—a unique feature that sets our methodology apart from others in
the literature. Therefore, airlines only care about how the improvement will affect their
markup, in other words, what are their returns for investing in on-time performance?
Over the last three decades, empirical studies on air travel have neglected to incorporate
service quality into air travel demand estimation, specifically the incorporation of delay-
based quality of service measures. The first model to incorporate service quality, proxied by
flight frequency, in a demand model is from De Vany (1975). Anderson and Kraus (1981),
Ippolito (1981), Abrahams (1983) and De Vany (1975) estimated air travel demand models
with schedule delay6 as a measure of service quality. We contribute to this literature.
6Defined as the sum of frequency delay and stochastic delay. Frequency delay is the gap between one’s
desired and the nearest offered departure time while stochastic delay is time lost due to the nearest offered
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A novel feature of this study is that we model demand on a passenger origin-destination7
demand rather than flight segment only. Previous demand studies, based on origin-destination
data, have been unable to incorporate flight delay8 and studies that have incorporated delay
(Abrahams, 1983; Anderson and Kraus, 1981; De Vany, 1975; Douglas and Miller, 1974; Ip-
polito, 1981), model demand on a service segment rather than passenger origin-destination
basis. But much air travel is done in several segments rather than non-stop. In fact, our
dataset shows that only 17 percent of itineraries are non-stop flights. Travelers demand
air transportation between a directional origin and destination pair and not segment-by-
segment. Given the importance of on-time performance to consumers,9 it is only reasonable
that a demand model incorporates such information. This, not only help to predict pas-
sengers’ behavioral intentions but provides a structure for the measurement of consumer
welfare effects of flight delay.
After estimating the demand model, we specify the supply-side assuming that prices are
set according to a static differentiated products Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with multiprod-
uct firms. With the static Bertrand-Nash assumption, we derive product-specific markups
and recover product-level marginal costs. With the estimated markups and marginal costs
in hand, we are able to specify and estimate markup and marginal cost functions. Both
functions allow us to measure on-time performance effects on markup and marginal cost.
Several conclusions emerge from the empirical analysis. First, other things equal, con-
sumers value on-time performance and are willing to pay for it. Our demand estimates
show that consumers are willing to pay $0.78 per minute late to avoid delay. We also found
that, from a strategic perspective, airlines do not have enough incentive to invest in on-time
performance because the change in markup is small and statistically insignificant. Further-
departure being unavailable.
7Tickets are issued for the entire itinerary which may include intermediate airport.
8Origin-destination passenger data contain no information on routings’ on-time performance.
9Our demand estimates show that passengers are willing to pay $0.78 on average for each additional
minute of flight delay to avoid delay.
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more, since markup is a function of price and marginal cost, we decompose the effects of
on-time performance on markup by separately estimating price and marginal cost functions.
We found that on-time performance affects price and marginal cost similarly in terms of co-
efficient magnitudes. This suggests that a marginal improvement in on-time performance
raises price and marginal cost by almost the same amount resulting in a zero net effect on
markup.
3.2 Literature Review
Researchers have written extensively on airline flight delays. The literature on flight delays
abounds in both operations management and economics. The operations management lit-
erature uses models that attempt to explain flight delays from an operational standpoint
of running an airline. Shumsky (1995) contributed to the literature of airline scheduling
performance analysis by examining US air carriers’ response to the on-time disclosure rule
of 1987. The rule creates incentives for the carriers to improve their on-time performance
by either reducing the amount of time to complete a flight or lengthening the amount of
time scheduled for a flight. Shumsky (1995) shows that although actual flight times have
fluctuated, scheduled flight times have increased significantly. Ramdas and Williams (2006)
investigate the tradeoff between aircraft utilization and on-time performance using queu-
ing theory and found out that flight delays increase with increasing aircraft utilization and
Sohoni et al. (2011) develop a stochastic integer programming model that achieves desired
trade-off between service level and profitability. They use two service-level metrics for an
airline schedule. The first one is similar to the on-time performance measure of the U.S.
Department of Transportation and the second metric, called the network service level, is
geared toward completion of passenger itineraries.
In the economics literature, researchers have tried to explain variations in flight delays
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by estimating how flight delay relates to airline hub size and airport concentration (Mayer
and Sinai, 2003), competition (Mayer and Sinai, 2003; Rupp et al., 2006; Mazzeo, 2003),
multimarket contact (Prince and Simon, 2009), prices (Forbes, 2008) and entry or threat of
entry (Prince and Simon, 2014), among others. Mayer and Sinai (2003) found that as origin
(destination) airport concentration increases, flight delays originating (arriving) from (to)
that airport decrease.
On the other hand, for both origin and destination airports, flight delays increase with
increasing airport hub size. Mazzeo (2003) found out that the prevalence and duration of
flight delays are significantly greater on routes where only one airline provides direct service.
Rupp and Holmes (2006) examined the determinants of flight cancellations such as revenue,
competition, aircraft utilization, and airline network. Prince and Simon (2009) tested the
mutual forbearance hypothesis (Edwards, 1955) using different measures of on-time perfor-
mance. This hypothesis suggests that firms that meet in multiple markets compete less
aggressively because they recognize that a competitive attack in any one market may call
for response(s) in all jointly contested markets. They conclude that multimarket contact
increases delays and that the effect is substantially larger in less competitive markets.
Forbes (2008) examines the effect of air traffic delays on airline fares and found out
that prices fall by $1.42 on average for each additional minute of flight delay, and that
the price response is substantially larger the more competitive the markets are. Prince
and Simon (2014) examine whether entry and entry threats by Southwest Airlines cause
incumbent airlines to improve their on-time performance as a way to protect their market
share. Surprisingly, their results show that incumbents’ delays increase with entry and entry
threats by Southwest Airlines. They provide two possible explanations for their findings: 1)
incumbents worsen on-time performance in an effort to cut costs in order to compete against
Southwest’s low costs/prices; or 2) incumbents worsen on-time performance to differentiate
away from Southwest, a top-performing airline in on-time performance.
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3.3 Dataset Construction and Definitions
3.3.1 Dataset Construction
We construct our dataset using data from two sources that span from the first quarter of 2002
to the fourth quarter of 2012 for 20 U.S. carriers.10 First, we use data from the Airline Origin
and Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by the Office of Airline Information of the Bureau
of Transportation Statistics. The data are quarterly and represent a 10 percent sample
of airline tickets from reporting carriers. Each record or itinerary contains the following
information; (i) the identities of origin, destination, and intermediate stop(s) airports on
an itinerary; (ii) the identities of ticketing and operating carriers on the itinerary; (iii)
the price of the ticket; (iv) the number of passengers who bought the ticket at that price;
(v) total itinerary distance flown from origin to destination; and (vi) the nonstop distance
between the origin and destination. Regrettably, passenger-specific information, that would
facilitate the estimation of a richer demand model than the one we use, is not available.
Information on ticket restrictions such as advance-purchase and length-of-stay requirements
are unavailable as well.
Second, we also use the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics (BTS) On-Time Performance data set to construct product quality
variables. All U.S. domestic carriers with revenues from domestic passenger flights of at
least one percent of total industry revenues must report flight on-time performance data.
The data frequency is monthly and covers scheduled-service flights between points within
the United States. So, a record in this survey represents a flight. Each record or fight con-
tains information on the operating carrier, the origin and destination airports, miles flown,
flight times, and departure/arrival delay information. Previous demand studies, based on
origin-destination data, have been unable to incorporate delay data because of the challenge
10See Table 3.1 for list of carriers in sample
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of matching the data sources described above. The challenge is that origin-destination pas-
senger data contain no information on routings’ on-time performance. To construct product
quality variables from the on-time performance data, we take the average departure (ar-
rival) delay measure for each carrier at any given origin (destination) airport in a quarter
for a given year. This aggregated on-time performance data is then matched to the DB1B
dataset. The matching process is done at all airports of the passengers’ itineraries. In this
study, we only focus on on-time performance at the itinerary final destination. In order to
construct our data set, we place some restrictions on the raw data:
(i) We confine our analysis to U.S. domestic flights operated by US domestic carriers.
(ii) We only focus on passengers purchasing round-trip, coach class tickets.
(iii) We exclude real airfares less than $25 or greater than $2,000. Dropping real airfares
that are too low gets rid of discounted airfares from passengers using their frequent-
flyer miles to offset the full price of the trip or employee travel tickets. Likewise,
excluding real airfares that are too high gets rid of first-class or business-class tickets.
(iv) Our analysis is limited to air travel products possessing at least 9 passengers to exclude
products that are not part of the regular offerings by an airline.
(v) Our analysis focuses on itineraries: (1) within the 48 states in US mainland; (2) no
more than one intermediate stop; and (3) with a single ticketing carrier.
(vi) Following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), markets selection focuses on air travel amongst
the 65 largest US cities. City size is based on the Census Bureau’s Population Esti-
mates Program (PEP), which publishes estimates of U.S. population. Data are drawn
from the category “Cities and Towns.” We use the size of population in the origin city
as a proxy for potential market size. Unlike Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we do not
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group cities that belong to the same metropolitan areas and share the same airport
since airport grouping will lessen the heterogeneity in on-time performance.
(vii) Given that there are often multiple records for the same itinerary because different
passengers paid different prices, we construct the price and quantity variables by
averaging the airfares and aggregating the number of passengers respectively based
on our product definition and then collapse the data by product. So, in the collapsed
data that we use for analyses, a product appears only once during a given time period.
Our final working dataset includes a total of 65 airports representing 1,346,384 air travel
products bought across 156,750 different directional city-pair markets.
3.3.2 Definitions
A market is a directional, round-trip between an origin and destination city during a specific
time period. By directional, we mean that a round-trip air travel from Chicago to Boston
is a distinct market from a round-trip air travel from Boston to Chicago. This directional
definition of a market controls for heterogeneity in demographics across origin cities that
may affect air travel demand (Berry et al., 2006; Gayle, 2007).
An itinerary is a planned route from an origin city to a destination city. It entails one or
more flight coupons, each coupon typically representing point-to-point travel between two
airports that could be on a particular flight segment.
An air travel product is defined as a unique combination of ticketing carrier, operating
carrier(s) and itinerary. Following Gayle (2007) and Ito and Lee (2007), we focus on three
types of air travel products: pure online; traditional codeshare; and virtual codeshare.
For a pure online product, the same airline is the ticketing and operating carrier on all
segments of the trip. For example, a two-segment ticket with both segments marketed by
Delta Air Lines and both segments of the itinerary are also operated by Delta Air Lines. An
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Table 3.1: Airlines in Sample
Code Airline
AA American Airlines
AQ Aloha Airlines
AS Alaska Airlines
B6 JetBlue Airways
CO Continental Air Lines
DH Independence Air
DL Delta Air Lines
F9 Frontier Airlines
FL AirTran Airways
HA Hawaiian Airlines
HP America West Airlines
NW Northwest Airlines
OO SkyWest
TZ ATA Airlines
UA United Air Lines
US US Airways
VX Virgin America Inc.
WN Southwest Airlines
XE ExpressJet Airlines
YX Midwest Airlines
air travel product is said to be code-shared if the operating and ticketing carriers for that
itinerary differ. We consider two types of codeshare products: (1) Traditional Codeshare;
and (2) Virtual Codeshare.
A traditional codeshare product has a single ticketing carrier, but multiple operating
carriers, one of which is the ticketing carrier. For example, a connecting itinerary operated
by Delta Air Lines (DL) and Northwest Airlines (NW) but marketed solely by Delta Air
Lines (DL) is a traditional codeshare product. A virtual codeshare air travel product has
the same operating carrier for all segments of the itinerary, but the ticketing carrier is
different from the operating carrier. For example, a connecting itinerary operated entirely
by Northwest Airlines (NW) but marketed solely by Delta Air Lines (DL) is a virtual
codeshare product
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For proper identification of the different types of product—pure online, traditional code-
share, and virtual codeshare—we recode regional feeder carriers to have their major carriers’
code.11 For instance, a product that involves Delta Air Lines (DL) and Comair Delta Con-
nection (OH), where one of them is the ticketing carrier and the other the operating carrier,
Comair Delta Connection is recoded as Delta Air Lines (DL). Without recoding, this prod-
uct would mistakenly be considered a codeshare product because the ticketing and operating
carriers are different.
3.4 Product Quality Variables
3.4.1 On-Time Performance Measures
Delay-based measures are obtained using on-time performance from the DOT BTS’ dataset.
According to the US DOT, flights that don’t arrive at (depart from) the gate within 15
minutes of scheduled arrival (departure) time are late arrivals (departures). This represents
performance measured against airlines’ published schedules. For example, if your flight is
scheduled to arrive at 3:30 p.m. and does not get in until 3:44 p.m., it is not late. With this
measurement standard, 81.9 percent of flights arrived on time in April 2015.12 However,
if we count all flights that arrive after their scheduled arrival time including when they
are one minute late, the industry’s “true” on-time performance drops to about 60 percent.
In this study, we focus on arrival on-time performance at destination. The three main
measures are arrival minutes late, the percentage of flights arriving at least 15 minutes late
and the percentage of flights arriving at least 30 minutes late. Table 3.2 summarizes on-
time performance by carrier and Hawaiian Airlines (HA) tops all carriers across on-time
performance measures. Figure 3.3 shows that overall, airlines performed the worst in 2007.
11The International Air Transport Association (IATA) uses two-character codes to identify all airlines;
for example the code DL is assigned to Delta Airlines.
12U.S. Department of Transportation (2015)
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Table 3.2: Airlines’ Mean Arrival Delay (2002:Q1—2012:Q4)
Code Airlines Minutes Late
% Flights Arriving
at Least 15 Minutes
Late
% Flights Arriving
at Least 30 Minutes
Late
HA Hawaiian Airlines 4.75 8.06 3.66
AQ Aloha Airlines 9.23 17.30 8.10
VX Virgin America Inc. 9.90 13.53 8.54
WN Southwest Airlines 9.96 18.27 10.17
HP America West Airlines 10.67 21.06 10.55
US US Airways 11.09 19.72 11.21
AS Alaska Airlines 11.84 19.96 11.41
F9 Frontier Airlines 12.02 23.08 11.70
DL Delta Air Lines 12.15 21.17 11.93
CO Continental Air Lines 12.90 21.72 12.41
NW Northwest Airlines 12.92 24.20 13.06
FL AirTran Airways 13.22 21.82 13.14
UA United Air Lines 13.31 21.21 13.21
TZ ATA Airlines 13.40 21.65 12.95
OO SkyWest 13.42 20.32 13.39
XE ExpressJet Airlines 13.48 24.34 14.16
AA American Airlines 13.71 22.61 13.93
YX Midwest Airlines 13.87 23.04 13.30
B6 JetBlue Airways 15.14 22.98 14.61
DH Independence Air 15.49 25.16 15.59
Overall Mean 12.12 20.56 11.85
Figure 3.3: Overall Airline On-Time Performance (2002–2012)
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3.4.2 Routing Quality Measure
We include the distance-based measure, Routing Quality, into our analysis following the
literature.13 Routing Quality is defined as the ratio of nonstop fight distance to the product’s
itinerary fight distance used to get passengers from the origin to destination. Based on
our routing quality measure, a nonstop flight between the origin and destination will have
the shortest itinerary flight distance. Hence, air travel products that require intermediate
airport stop(s) that are not on a straight path between the origin and destination, will have
an itinerary flight distance that is longer than the nonstop flight distance. Our rationale
for choosing this measure is that the longer the itinerary flight distance of an intermediate-
stop product relative to the nonstop flight distance, the lower the routing quality of the
intermediate-stop product.
3.4.3 Creation of Other Variables
In the collapsed and matched dataset, we create more variables to include in the demand
model. The observed product share variable is created by dividing quantity sold by the
market size. Measured non-price product characteristic variables include: Nonstop and
Origin Presence. Nonstop is an indicator variable that takes the value one if a product
has no intermediate stop. This variable constitutes one measure of the travel inconvenience
embodied in a product’s itinerary since passengers would prefer a non-stop product to one
with intermediate stop(s). The Origin Presence variable counts the number of different
cities that an airline provides service to via a nonstop flight from the origin airport of the
market.
We include dummy variables for quarter, year, origin, destination, and carrier to capture
unobserved product characteristics that vary across time periods, origins, destinations, and
13Reiss and Spiller (1989); Borenstein (1989); Ito and Lee (2007); Fa¨re et al. (2007) Gayle (2007, 2013).
Chen and Gayle (2013) and Gayle and Yimga (2014) use routing quality as defined in this paper.
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carriers that cannot be measured directly.
We create indicator variables for the different product types—pure online, traditional
codeshare, and virtual codeshare. Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for variables used
in our analysis.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price(a) 169.224 57.539 50.371 1679.103
Quantity 139.975 453.431 9 11266
Observed Product Share 0.00023 0.001 1.07E-06 0.095
Origin presence 17.510 23.281 0 142
Nonstop (dummy variable) 0.174 0.379 0 1
Itinerary distance flown (miles)(b) 1510.806 702.375 47 3982
Nonstop flight distance (miles) 1340.965 652.289 47 2724
Routing Quality(c) 0.890 0.129 0.337 1
Traditional Codeshare 0.016 0.124 0 1
Virtual Codeshare 0.029 0.167 0 1
Pure Online 0.955 0.206 0 1
Arrival On-Time Performance Variables:
Minutes Late 12.30 4.88 0 68.43
% flights arriving at least 15 minutes late 21.15 7.25 0 100
% flights arriving at least 30 minutes late 12.27 5.21 0 100
Number of Products 1,346,384
Number of Markets(d) 156,750
(a) Adjusted for inflation
(b) Reported as “market miles flown” in the DB1B database
(c) Defined as the ratio of non-stop distance to itinerary distance
(d) A market is an origin-destination-time period combination
3.5 The Model
3.5.1 Demand
The nested logit model is used to specify air travel demand. A typical passenger i may
either buy one of J products (air travel products), j = 1, ..., J , or otherwise choose the
83
outside good 0 (j = 0) for example, driving or using another transportation means. Thus,
passenger i makes a choice among Jmt + 1 alternatives in market m during time period t.
The nested logit model classifies products into G groups, and one additional group for the
outside good. Therefore, products are organized into G+ 1 mutually exclusive groups. The
passenger solves the following utility maximization problem:
Max
j∈{0,1,··· ,Jmt}
Uijmt = δjmt + σςimtg + (1− σ)εijmt (3.1)
δjmt = xjmtβ + αpjmt + ηj + υt + originm + destm + ξjmt (3.2)
where Uijmt is passenger i’s utility from choosing product j; δjmt is the mean level of utility
across passengers that choose product j; ςimtg represents a random component of utility
common across all products within the same group; εijmt is an independently and identically
distributed (across products, consumers, markets and time) random error term assumed to
have an extreme value distribution.
In Equation (3.2), xjmt represents a vector of observed non-price product characteristics
described below; pjmt is the price; ηj captures airline-specific fixed effects; υt captures time
period fixed effects; originm and destm are origin and destination city fixed effects and
ξjmt, the unobserved (by the researcher) component of product characteristics that affects
consumer utility.
The vector xjmt includes Routing Quality
14, Origin Presence which is a measure of
the size of an airlines airport presence, product-level zero-one codeshare dummy variables
(traditional and virtual codeshare) and a zero-one dummy variable that equals to unity only
if the product uses a nonstop flight to get passengers from the origin to destination. The
origin city presence variable is measured by the number of different cities an airline provides
14Note that including Routing Quality in our demand model is paramount since a positive estimate on
this variable would empirically validate that consumers’ choice behavior is consistent with the fact that
better routing quality is associated with a more desirable itinerary.
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service to using nonstop flights from the relevant market origin to destination cities.
The vector β measures the passenger’s marginal utilities associated with the product
characteristics. The parameter α captures the marginal utility of price. The parameter
σ lies between 0 and 1 and measures the correlation of consumer utility across products
belonging to the same airline. The correlation of preferences increases as σ approaches
1. In the case where is 0, the model collapses to the standard logit model where products
compete symmetrically. For notational convenience, we drop the market and time subscripts
to complete the derivation of the model.
Let there be Gg products in group g. If product j is in group g, then the conditional
probability of choosing product j given that group g is chosen, is given by:
Sj/g =
e(1−σ)
−1δj
Dg
where, Dg =
∑
j∈Gg
e(1−σ)
−1δj (3.3)
The probability of choosing group g or group g’s predicted share is given by:
Sg =
D1−σg
D1−σ0 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
(3.4)
The outside good is the only good in group 0. Therefore, D1−σ0 = e
δ0 . We normalize the
mean utility of the outside good to zero. This implies D1−σ0 = 1. Equation (3.4) can be
rewritten as:
Sg =
D1−σg
1 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
(3.5)
The unconditional probability of choosing product j or the market share of product j is:
Sj = Sj/g × Sg = e
(1−σ)−1δj
Dg
× D
1−σ
g
1 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
or Sj =
e(1−σ)
−1δj
Dσg
[
1 +
∑G
g=1D
1−σ
g
] (3.6)
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Therefore, the demand for product j is given by:
dj = M × Sj(x,p, ξ;α, β, σ) (3.7)
where M is a measure of market size—the population in the origin city. The predicted
market share of product j is Sj while x, p and ξ are vectors of observed non-price product
characteristics, price, and the unobserved vector of product characteristics. α, β and σ are
parameters to be estimated.
3.5.2 Product Markups and Product Marginal Costs
We assume that carriers simultaneously choose prices as in a static Bertrand-Nash model
of differentiated products. Let each carrier f offer for sale a set Ffm of products in market
m. Firm f ’s variable profit in market m is given by:
pifm =
∑
j∈Ffm
(pjm −mcjm)qjm (3.8)
where qjm = djm(p) in equilibrium, qjm is the quantity of travel tickets for product j sold
in market m, djm(p) is the market demand for product j in equation (3.7), p is a vector
of prices for the J products in market m, and mcjm is the marginal cost of product j in
market m. The corresponding first-order conditions are:
∑
r∈Ffm
(prm −mcrm)∂sr
∂pj
+ sjm(x,p, ξ;α, β, σ) = 0 for all j = 1, ..., J (3.9)
which can be rewritten in matrix notation as:
(p−mc)× (Ω ∗∆) + s(p) = 0 (3.10)
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where p, mc and s(·) are J × 1 vectors of product prices, marginal costs, and predicted
product shares respectively, while Ω ∗ ∆ is an element-by-element multiplication of two
matrices. ∆ is a J × J matrix of first-order derivatives of model predicted product market
shares with respect to prices, where element ∆jr =
∂sr(·)
∂pj
. Ω is a J×J matrix which describes
carriers ownership structure of the products. For example, let Ωjr denote an element in Ω,
where
Ωjr =
 1 if there exists f : {j, r} ⊂ Ff0 otherwise
That is, Ωjr = 1 if products j and r are offered for sale by the same carrier, otherwise
Ωjr = 0. Based on equation (3.10), the markup equation can be obtained as:
markup = p−mc = − (Ω ∗∆)−1 × s(p) (3.11)
With computed product markups in hand, product marginal costs can be recovered simply
by subtracting computed markup from price, i.e.
mc = p−markup (3.12)
3.5.3 Estimation of Demand and Marginal Cost Functions
The estimation strategy of the demand parameters (α, β, σ) is such that the observed
market shares Sjmt are equal to the market shares predicted by the model Sjmt. Empirical
industrial organization shows that the model presented above results in a linear equation:
ln(Sjmt)− ln(S0mt) = xjmtβ−αpjmt+σln(Sjmt/g)+ηj +υt+originm+destm+ ξjmt (3.13)
where Sjmt is the observed within group share of product j computed from the data by
Sjmt =
qjmt
M
where qjmt is the quantity of air travel product j sold and M is the population
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of the origin city. S0mt = 1−
∑
j∈Jm Sjmt is the observed share of the outside good. Sjmt/g
is the observed within-group share of product j and the other variables are described as in
Equation (3.2). Equation (3.13) can be estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
since price pjmt and Sjmt/g are endogenous.
After recovering the product marginal cost using equation (3.12), we use the following
linear specification for the marginal cost function:
m̂cjmt = τo + τ1OTPjmt + τ2Wjmt + ψj + µt + originm + destm + ε
mc
jmt (3.14)
where OTPjmt is the carrier’s on-time performance, Wjmt is a vector of observed marginal
cost-shifting variables, τ1 and τ2 are the associated vectors of parameters to be estimated.
ψj is an airline-specific component of marginal cost captured by airline fixed effects. µt are
time fixed effects captured by quarter and year dummy variables. originm and destm are
sets of origin and destination dummy variables respectively. Finally, εmcjmt is an unobserved
random component of marginal cost. τ1 would tell us by how much marginal cost would
change if airlines improve arrival delay by one minute, ceteris paribus. Likewise, we specify
markup and price equations and present the results in Tables 3.5 and 3.7.
3.5.4 Instruments for Endogenous Variables in Demand Equation
We exploit the fact that the set of product choices offered by airlines in a market is predeter-
mined at the time of exogenous shocks to demand while the non-price characteristics of an
airlines products are primarily determined by the route network structure of the airline.15
The instruments we use for the Two-stage Least Squares estimation are: (1) number
of competitors products in the market; (2) number of competing products offered by other
15Unlike price and within group product share, airline route network structure is fixed in the short run,
which mitigates the influence of demand shocks on the menu of products offered and their associated non-
price characteristics (Gayle and Xie, 2014)
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airlines with an equivalent number of intermediate stops; (3) number of other products
offered by an airline in a market; and (4) average number of intermediate stops across
products offered by an airline in a market. The rationale for using these instruments is
discussed in Gayle (2007, 2013). Instruments (1)-(3) are motivated by supply theory, which
predicts that a product’s price and within-group product share are affected by changes in
its markup.
Instruments (1) and (2) capture the degree of competition facing a product, which in
turn affects the size of a product’s markup. The use of instrument (3) is justified by the
fact that, all else constant, as an airline offers more substitute products in a given market,
the more capable the airline is to charge a higher markup on each of these products. The
intuition for instrument (4) is as follows. Since we are using the nested logit demand model,
we group products by airline. So, instrument (4) is likely to be correlated with the within
group share because passengers may prefer a set of products offered by a particular airline
to other airlines’ products owing to differences in number of intermediate stops associated
with the products.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Demand Results
We estimate the demand equation using both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two-stage
Least Squares (2SLS). Table 3.4 shows the demand regression results. As stated in section
(3.5.3), price pjmt and within-group product share Sjmt/g are endogenous variables in the
demand equation. Thus, OLS estimation produces biased and inconsistent estimates of the
price coefficient and σ. A Hausman test confirms by rejecting the exogeneity of price and
within-group product share at conventional levels of statistical significance.
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Table 3.4: Demand Estimation Results
Variables OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price 0.0003*** -0.0260*** -0.0253*** -0.0254***
(1.53e-5) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
ln(Sjmt/g) 0.4168*** 0.0265*** 0.0364*** 0.0333***
(0.0006) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Origin Presence 0.0122*** 0.0209*** 0.0208*** 0.0208***
(4.34e-5) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Nonstop 0.9815*** 0.7979*** 0.7943*** 0.7958***
(0.0025) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Routing Quality 1.8128*** 1.9659*** 1.9604*** 1.9714***
(0.0071) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0129)
Codeshare -0.7206*** -1.0022*** -0.9915*** -1.0069***
(0.0038) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0073)
Arrival On-Time Performance
Minutes late -0.0113*** -0.0204***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
% flights late more than 15 minutes -0.0204***
(0.0003)
% flights late more than 30 minutes -0.0333***
(0.0004)
Constant -10.6091*** -6.6820*** -6.5121*** -6.5424***
(0.0117) (0.0556) (0.0558) (0.0558)
Carrier Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Quarter and Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Market Origin fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Market Destination fixed effects YES YES YES YES
No. of Obs. 1,346,384 1,346,384 1,346,384 1,346,384
Endogeneity Test. H0: Price and ln(Sjmt/g) are exogenous
Wu-Hausman:
F(2, 1346218)= 43738.7***
(p = 0.0000)
F(2, 1346218)= 42988***
(p = 0.0000)
F(2,1346218)= 43449.3***
(p = 0.0000)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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To confirm the validity of instruments used in the 2SLS regression, we estimate first-
stage reduced-form regressions for each of the endogenous variables. First-stage reduced-
form regressions where we regress pjmt and Sjmt/g against the instruments suggest that the
instruments explain variations in the endogenous variables. R2 measures for the regressions
of price and within-group product share against the instruments are 0.0544 and 0.4202
respectively. Since the use of instruments is justified, we only discuss the 2SLS estimates.
The coefficient estimate on the price variable has the expected negative sign. All else
equal, an increase in the product’s price reduces the probability that a typical passenger
will choose the product. The coefficient estimate on ln(Sjmt/g), which is an estimate of σ
should lie between zero and one. σ measures the correlation of consumers’ preferences for
products offered for sale by the same airline.
Given that we nest products by airlines and that σ is statistically significant, this suggests
that passenger choice behavior shows some level of brand-loyalty to airlines. However, since
the estimate of σ is closer to zero than it is to one, this brand-loyal behavior is not very
strong. Even though airlines use customer loyalty programs to strengthen relationships
with their customers loyalty program, such programs do not provide exceptional advantages
mostly when any potential gain differential can be quickly eroded by competitive forces
(Dowling and Uncles, 1997).
The coefficient estimate on Origin presence is positive. This result is consistent with
our expectations and suggests that travelers prefer to fly with airlines, ceteris paribus, that
offer services to more destinations from the travelers’ origin city. Chen and Gayle (2013),
Gayle and Le (2013) and Berry (1990) among others, obtained similar findings.
The positive coefficient estimate on the Nonstop variable suggests that direct flights are
associated with higher levels of utility compared to connecting flights. Since we only consider
nonstop products and products with one intermediate stop, passengers prefer products with
nonstop flight itineraries to those with one intermediate stop when traveling from origin to
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destination. In fact, consumers are willing to pay up to $30.69 extra,16 on average, to obtain
a product with a nonstop itinerary in order to avoid products with intermediate stop.
The demand effects of code sharing are identified by interpreting the coefficient esti-
mates on the Codeshare variable. The coefficient estimate on Codeshare measures utility
differentials vis-a`-vis the Pure Online product type and suggests that code-shared products
are less preferred compared to pure online products. This may be the case because of the
streamlined nature of pure online products. An airline offering such products tend to better
organize its flights and schedules to minimize layover time, as well as efficiently organize its
own gates at airports (Gayle and Xie, 2014). It is well documented that codeshare partners
try to streamline flights across carriers to minimize layover times and facilitate smoother
connections, however this result suggests that codeshare streamlining has not achieved par-
ity with pure online products (Gayle, 2013). Consumers may perceive cooperation between
two carriers less attractive than flying on a single airline.
The positive coefficient estimate on Routing Quality suggests that passengers prefer
the most direct route to the destination. Consumers show preference for products with
itinerary fight distance as close as possible to the nonstop flight distance between the origin
and destination. So, consumer choice behavior is consistent with the premise that better
routing quality is associated with a more passenger-desirable itinerary. In fact, consumers
are willing to pay up to $75.60 extra,17 on average, for each percentage point increase that
the nonstop flight distance is of the actual itinerary flight distance.
The negative coefficient estimates on the on-time performance measures indicate that
consumer choice behavior is consistent with our expectations that products with longer
arrival delays at the destination airport are less desirable. The ratio of coefficient estimates of
“Minutes Late” and price in column 2 of Table 3.4 suggests that consumers are willing to pay
16This is obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate on the Nonstop dummy variable by the coefficient
estimate on Price from column 2 of Table 3.4.
17This is obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate on the Routing Quality variable by the coefficient
estimate on Price from column 2 of Table 3.4
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$0.78 on average for each additional minute of flight arrival delay to avoid delay. This implies
substantial welfare effects knowing that on average an airline carries about 140 passengers,
is 12 minutes late and that our dataset consists of 1,346,384 products. So, extrapolating
the consumer welfare effects due to arrival minutes late amounts to approximately $1.76
billion.18
This extrapolation is very conservative since it only accounts for delay at the final des-
tination. In reality, costs borne by passengers range from potential loss of business due
to late arrival at a meeting; partial loss of social activity (Cook et al., 2009) including
missed connections, cancelled flights, disrupted ground travel plans, forgone pre-paid hotel
accommodations, and missed vacation times (Schumer and Maloney, 2008).
Studies that have examined consumers’ reactions to product problems (Curren and
Folkes, 1987; Folkes, 1984) show that passengers would be less willing to fly an airline again
when delays are perceived to be controllable (caused by poor management for instance) than
when they are perceived to be uncontrollable (due to bad weather for instance). Also, even
when passengers may think that a delay may had arisen from an uncontrollable mechanical
failure, they still nevertheless believe that the airline could take action to solve the problem
(e.g., substitute another plane), and so refuse to fly that airline again (Folkes et al., 1987).
3.7 Markup, Marginal Cost and Price Results
3.7.1 Product Markup Regression Results
Table 3.5 shows the estimation results for a reduced-form product markup equation. Here,
we examine the impact of arrival on-time performance on product markups. The sign and
magnitude of the coefficient on “minutes late” suggests that arrival delay only marginally
affects product markups and this effect is not statistically significant. This indicates that
18Welfare costs to consumers = $0.78× 12× 1, 346, 384× 140
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improving on-time performance has no effect on product markup. We find in Tables 3.6 and
3.7 that this result is driven by the fact that on-time performance improvement costs offset
price increases, resulting in a zero net effect on product markups.
All other control variables in Table 3.5 have the expected sign and are statistically
significant. First, we know from our demand results that passengers prefer airlines with
large presence at the origin airport. Thus, we expect the coefficient estimate on the Origin
Presence variable to be positive indicating that the size of an airline’s presence at the
origin airport of a market is positively related to markup. As suggested by Borenstein
(1989), airlines have higher market power at their hub airports and are able to charge
higher markups on flights out of their hub airports.
Second, markups are greater on nonstop products compared to products with interme-
diate stop all else constant, as indicated by the positive coefficient estimate on the Nonstop
variable in Table 3.5.
The positive coefficient estimate for RoutingQuality indicates that the greater the rout-
ing quality of the itinerary, the higher the markup charged by the carrier, all else constant.
This is consistent with our demand results showing that consumers prefer streamlined travel
and are willing to pay more for travel that uses convenient routing.
Examining the effect of codesharing on markups, we find that the coefficient estimate
for the codeshare variable is negative and statistically significant. Thus, all else constant,
markups are lower on virtual and/or traditional codeshare products relative to pure online
products. Overall, these results suggest that airlines charge lower markups on codeshare
products compared to pure online products because consumers show a weaker preference
for this type of products compared to pure online products.
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Reduced-form Markup Regression
Variables
Coefficient
Estimate
Robust
Standard Errors
Minutes Late -3.23e-05 4.39e-05
Origin Presence 0.001*** 1.58e-05
Nonstop 0.046*** 6.66e-04
Routing Quality 0.017*** 7.43e-04
codeshare -0.018*** 3.47e-04
Constant 38.561*** 1.14e-03
Operating carrier effects YES
Origin city effects YES
Destination city effects YES
Quarter and Year effects YES
***p < 0.01
3.7.2 Marginal Cost Regression Results
We report the marginal cost equation estimation results in Table 3.6. As expected, arrival
on-time performance is inversely related to marginal cost. A one-minute reduction in delay
would cause marginal cost to increase by $0.30 since airline would have incur some costs in
order to improve on-time performance
From an operating cost perspective, airlines desire shorter scheduled flights to keep wages
of both flight attendants and pilots low (Mayer and Sinai, 2003). Thus, airlines have an
incentive to reduce their scheduled flight times, and the tradeoff that comes with this decision
is increased delays, higher customer waiting times and customer dissatisfaction. Mayer and
Sinai (2003) argue that it is also conceivable that having more business customers dissatisfied
due to delays could generate a higher goodwill cost.
The positive coefficient estimate for Origin Presence mc suggests that larger origin
presence increases the marginal cost. However, marginal cost increases at a diminishing
rate—the squared term of OriginPresence mc has a negative coefficient—all else constant.
An airline’s marginal cost increases initially with increases in the number of distinct cities
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results for Marginal Cost Regression
Variables
Coefficient
Estimate
Robust
Standard Errors
Minutes Late -0.303*** 0.009
Distance 0.036*** 8.32e-05
Origin Presence mc 0.687*** 0.008
(Origin Presence mc)2 -0.001*** 8.01e-05
Destination Presence mc 0.644*** 0.007
(Destination Presence mc)2 -0.001*** 6.94e-05
Constant 62.703*** 0.450
Operating carrier effects YES
Origin city effects YES
Destination city effects YES
Quarter and Year effects YES
***p < 0.01
that an airline has nonstop flights from, going into the origin airport, but eventually declines
with further increases in the number of cities. Another interpretation of this result is that,
cost efficiency gains due to economies of passenger-traffic density can be achieved when the
size of an airline’s airport presence exceeds some threshold level.
Similarly, the coefficient estimates onDestinationPresence mc and (OriginPresence mc)2
suggest that an airline’s marginal cost increases initially with increases in the number of
distinct cities that an airline has nonstop flights to, going out of the destination airport, but
the marginal cost increases at a decreasing rate. As expected, marginal cost increases with
distance flown, all else constant. A plausible explanation is that covering longer distances
requires more fuel.
3.7.3 Price Regression Results
Table 3.7 presents the estimation results for a reduced-form price equation. We examine the
impact of arrival on-time performance on airfares. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient
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on “minutes late” suggests that arrival delay is inversely related to prices (Forbes, 2008).
This estimate implies that each additional minute of delay reduces the price for airline travel
by $0.31. In other words, airlines can charge $0.31 for each additional minute reduction in
arrival delay.
Table 3.7: Estimation Results for Price Regression
Variables
Coefficient
Estimate
Robust
Standard Errors
Minutes Late -0.310*** 0.009
Origin Presence mc 0.685*** 0.008
(Origin Presence mc)2 -0.001*** 8.02e-05
Destination Presence mc 0.642*** 0.007
(Destination Presence mc)2 -0.001*** 6.95e-05
Routing Quality 7.909*** 0.412
Distance 0.037*** 7.92e-05
Codeshare -3.734*** 0.247
Constant 94.294*** 0.554
Operating carrier effects YES
Origin city effects YES
Destination city effects YES
Quarter and Year effects YES
***p < 0.01
The coefficient estimates on the presence variables and their respective squared terms
show that airlines charge higher prices the larger their presence at the origin and destination
airports but these prices increase at a diminishing rate, all else constant. This is consistent
with the presence of economies of passenger-traffic density that we found in the estimation
of the marginal cost function previously discussed.
The routing quality variable is associated with higher price. This relationship is sup-
ported by our demand model estimation that shows that passengers prefer streamlined
travel and are willing to pay more for travel that uses convenient routing. As expected, the
estimated coefficient on the distance variable suggests price increases with longer itinerary
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distances. Not surprising given that we found that itinerary distance is positively related
to marginal cost.
It appears that codeshare itineraries are associated with lower prices relative to pure
online itineraries. Consumers may perceive cooperation between two carriers less attractive
than flying on a single airline.
3.8 Conclusion
Researchers have long been interested in explaining why airlines are late. To answer this
question, most researchers have resorted to a reduced form estimation approach where they
explain variations in on-time performance through a set of explanatory variables. This
approach yields a set of parameters that describes the marginal impact of an explanatory
variable on on-time arrival performance. In contrast, we use a structural estimation ap-
proach.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, using a demand model, we measure the
cost of delay borne by consumers in terms of how much monetary value they are willing to
pay to avoid delay. We find that consumers are willing to pay $0.78 for every minute of
arrival delay which after extrapolation amounts to consumer welfare effects of $1.76 billion.
Second, with consumers having a preference for flights that arrive at destination on time, we
measure the incentive for airlines to provide on-time arrivals using a methodology that does
not require cost data to draw inference on changes in cost associated with improvement in
on-time performance. Our findings suggest that airlines have little to no incentive because
their markups do not increase when they improve on-time performance. In fact, the marginal
increase in price resulting from on-time performance improvement is offset by an increase
in marginal cost.
Stronger conclusions may be drawn from future work about the underlying mechanisms
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through which product quality may impact product markups. On-time performance is one
among other product quality dimensions such as mishandled baggage, oversales, consumer
complaints, in-flight amenities etc. Examining changes in these other quality dimensions
along with on-time performance may provide insights about how airlines engage in overall
quality differentiation in a strategic environment where firms are competing with each other.
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Appendix A
Supplemental Materials for Chapter 2
Table A.1: Mean On-time performance summary pre- and post-alliance
PRE POST
All
Carriers
Codeshare
partners
All
Carriers
Codeshare
partners
Arrival Delay (in minutes) 8.5 9.3 12.4 11.5
Departure Delay (in minutes) 7.7 6.8 11.2 8.5
Note: All tests of difference in means are statistically significant at 1% level
107
Figure A.1: Histogram of Departure Minutes Late
Figure A.2: Histogram of Arrival Minutes Late
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